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Electoral Abuse in the Late Roman Republic 
 
 
Howard Troxler 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
Escalating abuse of elections was a hallmark of the collapse of the Republic that 
governed at Rome for nearly 500 years before it was swept away and replaced by 
emperors and Empire. The causes of the Republic’s fall are well-explored, but electoral 
abuse was one of the agencies by which it was brought low – a “how” that helps explain 
the “why.” The abuse of regular electoral form, practiced by all parties, inured the 
Romans to further and ever-widening abuse. In the end their elections – and the Republic 
– lost both meaning and independence. This is a controversial claim that falls within the 
modern debate over the significance of the late-Republican turmoil and just how 
“democratic” the system was at all.  
A review of the primary source accounts shows a pattern of abuse that clearly 
accelerated over the final century, until the turning-point of the 60s and 50s B.C., a 
morass of elections delayed, canceled, marred by violence, ruined by bribery or 
prearranged by bargain. We can categorize these abuses and examine their effect on 
societal attitudes and subsequent practice. After 50 B.C. control of the state passed to 
Caesar and then the second triumvirs, who used these precedents to do as they pleased. In 
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the end Augustus “restored” the Republic by restoring its old forms – with an unspoken 
different meaning. It was no coincidence that Augustus paid showy respect to the 
Republican voting assemblies, the voting-places and the annual election rituals.  
The escalating abuse of elections inculcated in the Romans the idea that their 
constitution and the rule of law had no intrinsic value by themselves, but existed only as 
tools in the service of power and desired goals. With the rule of law battered into 
submission, the Republic all the more easily succumbed to the rule of men. The fall was 
brought about not by external armies or revolution, but by the Romans’ own tacit 
agreement that their rules could be bent and broken as needed. For the Romans, at least, 
the argument that “the ends justify the means” proved to be the antithesis and the undoing 
of constitutional government. 
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Part One: Introduction 
 
Electoral Abuse as Effect and Cause 
 
The Republic that governed at Rome for nearly 500 years with annually elected 
magistrates was wracked in its dying years by an unprecedented degree of electoral 
abuse. The yearly ritual of choosing the state’s leaders became a crass spectacle of delay, 
of manipulation, of mass bribery, of corrupt deal-making and of violence. To be sure, 
there had always been electoral irregularities. But as the Republic moved toward collapse 
in the mid-first century B.C., these abuses occurred more regularly in thickets and 
multitudes. Abusive tactics were employed eagerly by all sides and parties, with each 
group justifying its practice by the offenses of the other. The Romans recognized the 
damage they were causing and railed at each other for it, but they were unable or 
unwilling to stop. Each episode served to justify the next. In the end, the forms and 
purposes of the ancient constitution no longer mattered. Once the state fell under the 
personal control of the despots, Caesar and the Second Triumvirate, they had ample 
precedent to do with the elections as they pleased. When Augustus emerged as the 
ultimate victor, the key to his consolidation of power was his “restoration” of Republican 
forms, and the elections in particular. So it was the abuse of elections that helped put the 
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Republic in its sickbed, and it was the Augustan pretense of “restoring” them that helped 
supply the Republic’s death-blow. 
This certainly is not a claim that electoral abuse “caused” the failure of the Roman 
Republic. Centuries of learned scholars have spent lifetimes on that question. The usual 
suspects for driving the Republic to collapse include the breakdown of social consensus, 
renewed class struggle, land-hunger by the masses, plebeian armies loyal to ambitious 
warlords, the problems of Italian citizenship, weak and reactionary senate leadership, and 
the wanton willfulness of the tribunes – to name a few.1 Yet the nexus at which the 
interests of all these rival groups came together was the annual elections, the core of the 
Roman political identity, the heartbeat of the res publica. Their machinations to delay, 
pre-ordain, purchase or bully those elections became one of the agencies by which the 
state was driven off the cliff – one of the “hows’’ of the story. In so doing, they also 
made electoral abuse one of the “whys,” as it became a causal factor in its own right. 
Electoral abuse inured the Romans to their weakened constitution, made alternatives 
more conceivable, emboldened and enabled the despots, and gave Augustus and his 
supporters a ready platform. Thus escalating attacks on electoral form were both an 
effect, and one of the many causes, of the Republic’s march toward chaos. 
                                                 
1 To name a few examples from authors quoted in this paper: For the rise of the knights, generals and 
Italians, L.R. Taylor, Party Politics in the Age of Caesar (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949), 
17; for the Senate’s inaction creating a “crisis of credibility” in the constitution, J. Von Ungern-Sternberg, 
“The Crisis of the Republic,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Republic, ed. H. Flower. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 96; for personal hatred as opposed to structural causes for 
the civil war, A.K. Goldsworthy, Caesar: Life of a Colossus (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 
379. A good shopping-list of causes is found in P.A. Brunt, The Fall of the Roman Republic and Related 
Essays (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), for instance, mismanaged provinces and the Italian problem, 69; 
conflict between senatorial class and equites, 72; failure to control the army, 77; weakness of the senate, 
79-81.  
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 This contention that electoral abuse “mattered” is not at all a dry and dusty fact – it is 
controversial. Two trends in the modern debate surrounding this issue are relevant. The 
first is whether the late Republican political convulsions truly contributed to a “fall” of 
the state at all. Some, notably E.S. Gruen, argue that the Republic remained reasonably 
stable until the end, and that the first-century political turmoil was well within the bounds 
of flexible Republican practice. In Gruen’s view it took the brute force of civil war and 
the armies of Caesar and Cn. Pompeius Magnus to topple an otherwise sturdy 
government. A second line of the modern debate, led by F. Millar and others, challenges 
the older orthodoxy that the Roman state was not really “democratic,” but rather that the 
voting assemblies and the plebs urbana were pawns in a controlling patron-client system. 
This debate, too, bears heavily on the significance of electoral abuse. If the whole 
electoral mechanism was a sham and everybody knew it, then election abuse meant 
considerably less than if meaningful constitutional institutions were under attack. 
After a look at these modern debates, we need to set some ground rules for defining 
“abuse,” because “abuse” is a charged and subjective term. The question is not whether 
the Republicans abused their elections by our standards, but whether they abused them by 
their standards. To say that the Roman Republican electoral system was more “flexible” 
than our own is an understatement – imagine a U.S. president declaring on the morning 
of Election Day that he has suddenly decided to postpone the affair indefinitely! So we 
need to know what was “normal” and what was not, and how to gauge when the normal 
practice crossed into abuse. Then we can survey the general categories of electoral abuse 
in our source accounts and see how they escalated. Such categories include (1) elections 
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delayed or canceled, (2) violations of the laws concerning ages and terms of candidates, 
(3) cynical manipulation of the state religion, (4) the effect of violence and gangs, (5) 
bribery and electioneering, (6) electoral cabals and prearranged results, (7) usurpation of 
constitutional roles, and (8) violations of process as well as other miscellaneous abuses. 
We will see how all of this reached a boiling-point in the climactic years 70-50 B.C., how 
the Romans recognized their abuses, accepted them and then cited them to justify further 
violations, and how the despots trampled the remainders of the constitution and 
determined the elections and magistracies by their whim. Lastly, we will see how 
Augustus cannily “restored” the forms of Republican elections and glorified them as part 
of the pretext by which he gained supreme power. Whether the old Republic had fallen or 
been pushed, it was surely broken, and the career talent of Augustus was to get to 
everyone to agree (or to pretend) that he had fixed it. 
 
The Modern Debate 
 
In 1974, E.S. Gruen published his Last Generation of the Roman Republic. A major 
theme of the book is summed up in his conclusion: “Civil war caused the death of the 
Republic – and not vice-versa.”2 Gruen saw the political events of the Republic’s final 
decades within a context of overall stability, despite the occasional ruckus coming from 
the streets. He surveys the consuls elected during the 70s and 60s B.C. and finds 
considerable continuity from the Sullan era; the Pompeians do not manage to wrest away 
                                                 
2 E.S. Gruen,  The Last Generation of the Roman Republic (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 
504. 
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control of the state nor to repeal (not yet, at least) the Sullan constitution. Gruen 
downplays the significance of the first triumvirate of Caesar, Pompey and M. Licinius 
Crassus, an arrangement which he calls largely a modern construct, and likewise the 
renewal of that pact at Luca in 56. Gruen further argues that during the 50s the first 
triumvirs, despite their portrayal as a malevolent power pushing levers behind the curtain, 
had little actual influence over the elections, with the glaring exception (proving the rule) 
being the arranged consulships of Pompey and Crassus in 55.3 As for the constitutional 
climax of the decade – the bizarre sole consulship of Pompey in early 52 – Gruen is not at 
all perturbed, saying that the innovation had legitimate roots in the Republican 
dictatorship.4 Along similar lines, Gruen argues that the frequency of bribery 
prosecutions in the last decades does not prove an increased frequency of bribery itself, 
since the prosecutions often had political motives. To him the episodes of political 
violence so often attested in our sources were typical of pre-industrial societies, were 
usually staged anyway, and did not reflect a desire to tear down the government (“It 
would be a mistake to equate turbulence with revolution”). Even the Catilinarian crisis of 
63 “did not shake the foundations of the state.” To Gruen the government was in no real 
danger of toppling; the conspiracy of Catiline, in fact, strengthened awareness of a 
common interest in stability.5 
                                                 
3 For Sullan continuity in the 70s, see Gruen, Last Generation, 126; for his views on the consuls of the 70s 
and 60s, 140; for the significance of the triumvirate as largely a modern construct, 90; for the overstatement 
of  Luca, 101; for the relative continuity of elections in the 50s, 141. 
4 Gruen, Last Generation, 153. 
5 For bribery trials as politically motivated, see Gruen, Last Generation, 160; for his argument on the role 
of violence, 405; for his view on the Catalinarian conspiracy, 431. 
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Others closer to the present day have followed Gruen. K.M. Girardet in 1996 
concurred in blaming the dynasts and not a systemic weakness: “Nein: die römische 
Republik ist nicht ,gescheitert’, sie ist systematisch und zielgerichtet zerstört worden.”6 
A. Yakobson, in his influential recent work on Republican elections, held that violence, 
bribery and other irregularities did not overly affect the outcome of affairs until late in the 
Republic.7 
But the evidence for instability in the late Republic is considerable, as we will see in 
detail in the category-by-category survey of electoral abuse. Gruen forces his argument in 
several places. He and his successors must vie against a historiographic tradition that 
goes back to our original sources. For good reason, Roman history textbooks 
unanimously begin their chapters on the fall of the Republic in 133 B.C. Velleius 
Paterculus beats them to the punch by nearly two millennia with his observation that after 
the death of Tiberius Gracchus the rule of law gave way to power, civil disagreement 
turned to violence, and wars were fought for profit rather than for rightful cause.8 Even if 
we allow for Cicero’s histrionics, the corpus of his work shows his awareness of the 
fraying of the state. Sallust, admittedly, was prone to complaining about his times, and 
oversimplified a complex problem as a bipolar struggle. But he perceptively assesses the 
demoralizing effects of total victory over Carthage and Rome’s achievement of 
unchallenged superpower status: 
                                                 
6 K.M. Girardet, “Politische Verantwortung im Ernstfall: Cicero, die Diktatur under der Diktator Caesar,” 
ΛΗΝΑΙΚΑ: Festschrift für Carl Werner Müller zum 65. Geburtstag am 28.Januar 1996 (Stuttgart: Teubner, 
1996), 249. For another argument on stability, see K.-J. W. Welwei-Bochum, “Caesars Diktatur, der 
Prizipat des Augustus und die Fiktion der historischen Notwendigkeit,” Gymnasium 103 (1996), 477-97. 
7 A. Yakobson, Elections and Electioneering in Rome. A Study in the Political System of the Late Republic 
(Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1999), 113. 
8 Vell. 2.3.3: Inde ius vi obrutum potentiorque habitus prior, discordiaeque civium antea condicionibus 
sanan solitae ferro diiudicatae bellaque non causis inita, sed prout eorum merces fuit. 
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And so the nobles began to take advantage of their status, and the 
people abused their liberty in wantonness, and each man led 
himself into robbery and pillage. In this way the whole was divided 
in two, and the state between these extremes was torn to pieces.9 
 
 
The modern scholarship also is overwhelmingly in favor of “decline” and we will see in 
each category that the authors who specialize in that subtopic – bribery, violence and so 
forth – conclude that the abuses become more frequent and more serious at the end. P.A. 
Brunt, in his own Fall, concludes that the Republican constitution simply could not 
withstand the pressure when all players in the system wielded their obstructive powers to 
the utmost. The senate was blind to the pressures that resulted from imperial expansion 
and the Italian problem, while the equites, the plebs, the peasantry and the soldiers ripped 
the state apart.10 L.R. Taylor11 recognizes the pressures coming from the knights, the 
Italians and the army warlords, as does D. Shotter.12 In support of the argument that there 
were structural forces behind the rise of electoral abuse in the late Republic, H. Mourtisen 
argues its cause was increasing competition for power and status.13 A.W. Lintott, despite 
an overall argument in favor of constitutional flexibility, admits that the abuse of form 
had an effect: the “conflict and near-anarchy” of the last years typified “a loss of 
credibility in institutions traditionally regarded as authoritative – the senate and the 
                                                 
9 Sall. Iug. 41.5: Namque coepere nobilitas dignitatem, poplus libertatem in lubidinem vortere, sibi quisque 
ducere, trahere, rapere. Ita omnia in duas partis abstracta sunt, res publica, quae media fuerat, dilacerata. 
The author’s translation. 
10 Brunt, Fall, 81. 
11 Taylor, Party Politics, 17. 
12 D. Shotter, The Fall of the Roman Republic (London: Routledge, 1994), 97. 
13 H. Mouritsen, Plebs and Politics in the Late Roman Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), 126.  
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higher magistracies in the city.”14 In another work, Lintott further acknowledges the role 
of procedural abuse in the collapse with a telling comment:  “Moral failure did in fact 
contribute to the overthrow of the Roman Republic but it lay in the choice of means 
rather than the choice of ends.”15 This debate, then, between the stability or instability 
and the effects of constitutional abuse looms over our discussion of irregularities in the 
elections. 
 A second relevant theme in modern scholarship concerns the degree to which the 
Republic was really “democratic,” in the sense that the voting assemblies and the 
plebeian population had a say in affairs. The traditional view of late 19th- and early 20th-
century scholars, particularly T. Mommsen and M. Gelzer, was that Republican Rome 
was an oligarchy with the citizen assemblies effectively controlled by patron-client 
relations. The consensus was that Polybius had been duped when he enthusiastically 
described Rome’s “mixed constitution” as one of checks and balances among monarchy 
(the magistrates), aristocracy (the senate) and democracy (the assemblies).16 In 1939, R. 
Syme characterized the Augustan transformation as an oligarchic revolution, and he 
propounded a much-quoted dictum: 
 
In all ages, whatever the form and name of government, be it 
monarchy, republic or democracy, an oligarchy lurks behind the 
façade, and Roman history, Republican or imperial, is the history 
of the governing class.17 
 
                                                 
14 A.W. Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 213. 
15 Lintott, Violence in Republican Rome (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 208. Emphasis supplied. 
16 Polybius’ well-known constitutional analysis is set out in the sixth book of his Roman history. Polybius, 
The Rise of the Roman Empire, trans. B. Radice; intro. F.W. Walbank (London: Penguin Books, 1990). 
17 R. Syme, The Roman Revolution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939), 7.  
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This patron-client model for Republican politics became the orthodox view, and many 
subsequent scholars such as Taylor and H.H. Scullard agreed. Taylor, before her later 
work on Republican voting assemblies, stated flatly that at the annual elections, “nobles 
and senators determined the outcome under the system of personal commendation.”18  
Orthodoxy is created to be challenged. In the latter 20th century new generations of 
Republican scholars argued there is simply too much evidence that the power of the 
populus Romanus was real and discretionary, that it mattered a great deal in the outcome 
of contested elections and debates, and that rather than commanding the masses, the 
nobles had to court popular favor to win elections and support for their causes. Foremost 
among these latter-day scholars is F. Millar, whose works from the 1980s onward 
explored the importance of oratory and mass opinion and showed the lengths to which the 
candidates and nobles went to seek popular favor. Millar states: 
 
Far from being a tightly controlled, “top-down” system, the late Republic 
was on the contrary a very striking example of a political system in which 
rival conceptions of state and society, and rival policies, as regards both 
internal structures and external relations, were openly debated before the 
crowd in the Forum.19 
 
Because election to the magistracies constituted admission to the senate, Millar sees the 
popular assemblies as the grantor of status, not its servant. True, the fasti of consuls show 
an overwhelming preference for aristocrats, but Millar and several others replied that 
these lists merely show a customary deference to noble status, and the preference of the 
                                                 
18 Taylor, Party Politics, 75. 
19 F. Millar, The Crowd in Rome in the Late Republic (Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press, 1998), 
7. See also his work from the 1980s onward on the democratic nature of the Republic in The Roman 
Republic and the Augustan Revolution, H. M. Cotton and G. M. Rogers, eds. (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University 
of North Carolina Press, 2002). 
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crowd for a certain political pedigree in their choice of candidates.20 R. Morstein-Marx 
agreed in 1998: “There is no reason why this should not have come about by the free 
exercise of the vote, as is implied, for example, by popular leaders’ criticism of the 
People for perpetuating their ‘slavery’ by means of their own votes.”21 Brunt concurs that 
a “splendid lineage” could be a fine asset in competitive elections.22 G. Hopkins and K. 
Burton, in an interesting analysis of the Republican aristocracy, point out that the 
argument for control by the “nobility” ignores the rise and fall of individual families, and 
show that surprisingly small percentages of men of consular rank either descended from, 
or were ancestors of, consuls in the immediately surrounding generations.23 
Yakobson’s 1999 Elections and Electioneering points out that the mass-scale bribery 
depicted in ancient sources would hardly have been necessary if elections were a 
foregone conclusion. He concludes: “Polybius knew what he was talking about after 
all.”24 E. Deniaux, in a study of the use of urban space in the Republic, notes the array of 
spectacle, the necessity of physical presence and direct appeal to voters, and the role of 
oratory and entertainments associated with forming public opinion, all of which involved 
the whole city: “Tout ceci permet de reenforcer l’hypothèse d’une forme de commication 
                                                 
20 Millar, Roman Republic, 133.  Even in the U.S. system, voters have favored more than one candidate 
from certain well-known families, including Adamses, Roosevelts, Kennedys, Bushes and Clintons. 
21 R. Morstein-Marx, “Res Publica Res Populi,” review of A. Yakobson, Elections and Electioneering in 
Rome, SCI 19 (2000), 229. Morstein-Marx specifically cites Sallust’s speech of Macer (Hist. 3.48.6), 
castigating the people for their choices. 
22 Brunt, Fall, 28. 
23 G. Hopkins and K. Burton, “Political Succession in the Late Republic, 249-50 B.C.,” in Death and 
Renewal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). For the rise and fall of gens, see p. 38; for the 
statistics on consular descendants, 32. 
24 Yakobson, Elections and Electioneering, 233. 
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écrite dans la campagne électorale romaine. Ces quelques remarques imposent donc 
l’ideé d’une participation de la ville entière à la préparation des elections.”25 
Our primary sources contain many indications that elections involved the free 
expression of popular will. Cicero informs us that a consular candidate in 65 B.C. loses 
by only a few centuries, the voting units in the consular electoral assembly, indicating a 
split decision (paucae centuriae ad consulatem defuerent). In a letter Cicero approvingly 
notes that one of Milo’s assets as a consular candidate for 52 B.C. is popular appeal. In a 
defense oration Cicero commiserates with his fellow leaders of the state that they must be 
“tossed about by the waves and storms of popular favor.”26 The younger M. Porcius Cato 
provides a negative example: by refusing to kowtow to the electorate in the usual fashion 
in 52 he failed to win office.27 Speaking most directly the point is the Commentariolum 
Petitionis attributed to Q. Cicero, a sort of “pocket manual” for candidates, stressing the 
importance of remembering names (nomenclatio), manner (blanditia), persistence 
(adsiduitas), generosity (benignitas), a public buzz (rumor), and impressive manner 
(species in re publica).28 We even know of the modern-sounding gaffe of a consular 
candidate who makes an unfortunate joke after shaking the callused hand of a working 
man; the angry reaction spreads throughout the city and he is defeated.29  
                                                 
25 E. Deniaux, E. “De l’ambito à l’ambitus: les lieux de la propagande et de la corruption électorale à la fin 
de la République,” in L’urbs: espace urbain et histoire (Ier siècle av. J.-C. – IIIe siècle ap. J.C.), (Rome: 
Actes du colloque international organisé par le Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique et L'École 
Française de Rome, 8-12 mai 1985), 304. 
26 See Brut. 237 for the close vote; for Milo’s popular appeal, Fam. 2.6.3; for being subject to public 
opinion, Planc. 11;  
27 Plut. Cat. Min. 49-50; Dio 40.58. 
28 This summation is from R. Morstein-Marx, “Publicity, Popularity and Patronage in the Commentariolum 
Petitionis,” Cl. Ant. 17 (1988), 41-53. 
29 Val. Max. 7.5.2. 
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So successful have been the arguments of Millar and his colleagues that a counter-
reformation has arisen. If Rome was not a top-down oligarchy, neither was it exactly the 
Athenian democracy – the democratic argument, these scholars reply, goes too far in 
downplaying the important role still played by the senate and the nobiles and the 
restraining influences of tradition, religion and culture. Mouritsen points out that 
participation in the actual democratic process was limited both by the physical aspects of 
the city and by the distances of the growing empire. The contiones, or public debates, that 
Millar and others cite as examples of the rough-and-tumble democracy were quite often 
merely staged events. Mouritsen notes there are only a handful of documented cases in 
which a voting assembly rejected a legislative proposal once it had been put forth.30 In a 
2000 article, K.-J. Hölkeskamp criticizes Millar for focusing too narrowly on the 
legislative and electoral machinery while ignoring the considerable unwritten gravitas of 
the senate and the moral authority of the mos maiorum. Hölkeskamp sees the electoral 
assemblies more as a tool used to allot power among the elites.31 J.A. North, in a much-
quoted passage, cautions that the semblance of competitive elections lasted only as long 
as there were divisions within the elite, and quickly disappeared once a single despot (or 
triumvirate) took power: “The moment that competition ceases... voters’ opinions can all 
too soon lose their importance to those holding power.”32   
                                                 
30 For Mouritsen’s argument on the staged nature of the contiones see Plebs and Politics, 52; for his views 
on the physical limitations on participation, 32. 
31 K.-J. Hölkeskamp, “The Roman Republic: Government of the People, by the People, for the People?” 
Review of F. Millar, The Crowd in Rome in the Late Republic, SCI 19 (2000). For his “machinery” 
argument, see 212-213; for his view on the assembly as a power-distribution device used by elites, 219. 
32 J.A. North, “Democratic Politics in Republican Rome,” P&P 126 (Feb. 1990), 21. 
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On balance, however, the evidence shows that the will of the electorate played more 
of a role in the affairs of the Republic than allowed in the rigid patron-client model. The 
leaders of Rome were chosen by the people, answered to them, strove to persuade them, 
catered to them, entertained them and bribed them. There was some freedom of choice in 
the elections and some unpredictability as to their outcome. All of this supports the 
conclusion that the elections were, indeed, the centerpiece of the Roman political process. 
Yakobson makes a vital point: “It was precisely because the people’s prerogative – their 
suffrage – was real rather than specious, because it gave them a real (albeit limited) stake 
in the system, that the people accepted the Republican political system as legitimate.”33 
The elections mattered to the citizens immensely – and so therefore did the battering of 
the electoral process that presaged the end of the Republic. Millar gets the last word, with 
a rhetorical flourish: 
 
Was all this a charade managed from above – the election of over 
fifty office-holders a year, the declaration of war and the voting on 
treaties, the passing of legislation, the trials of office-holders and 
private citizens? 34 
 
 
Problems in Defining ‘Abuse’ 
 
Every year was an election year in the Republic. After the expulsion of the kings, 
which occurred in 509 B.C. according to legend, Rome was typically governed by 
annually elected magistrates. These magistrates included two consuls with supreme 
                                                 
33 Yakobson, Elections and Electioneering, 229. 
34 Millar, Roman Republic, 150. 
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military command and collegial authority, a varying number of praetors, aediles and 
quaestors with lesser functions, and the tribunes of the plebs. In addition to these annual 
officers, a pair of censors served five-year terms, with power to revise the citizenship 
rolls and to regulate the membership of the senate and public contracts. In times of crisis 
during the early and middle Republic, the government could suspend normal operations 
and appoint a dictator, whose authority superseded the regular magistrates. But the 
dictator was usually named to address a specific problem; his term was limited and the 
institution of the dictatorship served its purpose without being overly abused.35 Lastly, in 
the event that the terms of sitting magistrates had expired without new elections to 
replace them, the senate could name an interrex, a temporary magistrate to preside over 
new elections. 
The magistrates were elected by the popular assemblies, the comitia: 
* The comitia centuriata, organized by military “centuries,” which elected the 
consuls, praetors and censors. Because this assembly represented the Roman people 
under arms, in the act of granting imperium to their commanders, it met outside the 
pomerium on the Campus Martius.36 
* The comitia tributa, in which the population was divided into 35 voting “tribes,” in 
theory corresponding to geography, to elect the aediles and quaestors. 
                                                 
35 Two exceptions from the early and middle Republic do not concern our discussion of latter-day elections. 
In earlier practice the consular power was sometimes subdivided amongst a set of military tribunes. Livy’s 
Book 3 also tells the colorful story of the board of 10 (decemvirs) appointed to revise the laws but 
ultimately forced to step aside after abusing their position. 
36 Gellius, NA 15.27.5: Centuriata autem comitia intra pomerium fieri nefas esse, quia exercitum extra 
urbem imperari oporteat, intra urbem imperari ius non sit. Propterea centuriata in campo Martio haberi 
exercitumque. imperari praesidii causa solitum, quoniam populus esset in suffragiis ferendis occupatus. 
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* The concilium plebis, which was essentially the tribal assembly sans patricians. 
This council sat as a plebeian body to elect the tribunes of the people, with a tribune 
presiding.37 
All of these assemblies also had legislative authority, although the tribal assembly and the 
concilium plebis were the primary lawmaking bodies. 
 These assemblies were not “democratic” or “republican” bodies in the sense that we 
use the terms today. The centuriate assembly, elector of the senior magistrates, was 
weighted by property qualifications according to a census. This practice dated from the 
time of the kings, and votes weighted for wealth seemed perfectly natural to the Romans 
– after all, who better to judge the affairs of the state, than those with the most at stake? 
Because the classes voted in descending order, the centuries of the equites (the “knights”) 
and the first two of the five property classes often were enough to carry the day.38 
Furthermore, censuses were conducted irregularly or not at all, causing the makeup of the 
centuries to be more and more unreflective of true conditions. No census was taken 
between 86 and 70 B.C., even as the nature of the citizenship changed dramatically in the 
wake of the Social War. When Pompey and Crassus finally had a lustrum conducted 
during their consulship of 70 B.C., to break the hold of the old guard, the voting-rolls 
                                                 
37 The best modern summation of the far-and-wide evidence on the nature and workings of the comitia 
remains L.R. Taylor, Roman Voting Assemblies from the Hannibalic War to the Dictatorship of Caesar 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966). Also see the meticulous work of G.W. Botsford,  The 
Roman Assemblies from Their Origin to the End of the Republic (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 
1968). The fourth of the Republican assemblies, the comitia curiata, plays little role in our discussion of 
electoral procedure.  
38 The extent of the upper classes’ control has been the subject of fresh debate as well. Yakobson, Elections 
and Electioneering, 20, asks whether the gap between richest and poorest, and the voting-bloc solidarity of 
the upper classes, was as pronounced as traditionally assumed. See also Yakobson, “Petitio et Largitio: 
Popular Participation in the Centuriate Assembly of the Late Republic,” JRS Vol. 82. (1992), 44. 
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were nearly doubled.39 It was the only census conducted between the dictatorship of L. 
Cornelius Sulla and Augustus.40 
Representation also was unequal even in the “popular” assemblies, the comitia tributa 
and its alter ego, the plebeian council, which used as their voting units the 35 tribes of the 
Roman people. Each tribe had one vote, with the contest decided as soon as a majority of 
18 out of the 35 possible votes had occurred. But tribal membership was not equally 
assigned: The masses of the city were crammed into four urban tribes, with the propertied 
classes comfortably spread out among the other 31. This was a source of long-standing 
tension between the classes. Livy with a disdainful sniff tells us that the fourth-century 
censor Appius Claudius caused an uproar by distributing freedmen among the rural 
tribes, contributing to the election of a particularly disruptive aedile. In 304 the next 
censors restored these “the lowest of the low” to their grubby station in the urban tribes.41 
During the period with which we are concerned, on the last day of 67 B.C., the tribune 
Gaius Manilius brought through a bill that again distributed the freedmen amongst the 
tribes. On the following day the senate immediately declared it invalid.42 
The state calendar could be manipulated to block assemblies or reschedule them for 
politically opportune reasons. Because there were laws that barred the consideration of 
legislation for a certain period before an election, and laws governing the minimum time 
allowed between the proposal of a law and its passage, the calendar was a familiar 
                                                 
39 Livy Per. 98. 
40 Plut. (Crass. 13) says that Crassus as censor in 65 “literally accomplished nothing at all.” 
41 Livy 9.46. 
42 Dio 36.42.2-3. For discussion of the unequal assignment of voters to tribes, see especially L.R. Taylor, 
The Voting Districts of the Roman Republic; The Thirty-Five Urban and Rural Tribes, Papers and 
Monographs of the American Academy in Rome, 20 (1960); see also Taylor, Voting Assemblies, 64; Brunt, 
Fall, 24. 
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tactical tool for late Republican politicians. The comitia could meet only on the dies 
comitiales, those dates permitted on the Republican calendar, numbering about 195 days 
of the year.43 That number could be further reduced. The magistrates could sometimes 
control affairs merely by extending or rescheduling festival days. The Romans took the 
prohibitions of their calendar seriously: The date of every known meeting of the comitia 
from the years 189 to 49 occurs on a day that was comitialis.44 A calculated delay could 
be used to discourage turnout or to drive away voters who had expressly traveled to the 
city for the assembly, since some delays required the lapse of three market-days 
(trinundinum), a minimum of 17 days.45 Yet another factor was the decision to insert, or 
not to insert, the intercalary month required to keep the Republican calendar in sync with 
the physical year.46 
On the day of an election, the presiding magistrate -- typically a consul for the 
centuriate assembly, a consul or praetor for the tribal assembly, and a tribune for the 
plebeian council – wielded immense power and influence over the proceedings.47 One of 
these powers was control of who appeared on the ballot in the first place, since candidates 
                                                 
43 A.K. Michels, The Calendar of the Roman Republic (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967), 
31. 
44 Michels, Calendar, 45. 
45 F.B. Marsh, “The Gangster in Roman Politics,” CJ Vol. 28, No. 3 (Dec. 1932), 171. 
46 Examples of calendar manipulation: Cic. Q Fr. 2.5.2, praising the consul Lentulus for extending the 
Latin Festival to occupy the remaining comitial days; Sest. 33 on the attempt by Clodius to expand the 
number of legal meeting-days (ut omnibus fastis diebus legem ferri liceret); Dio 40.62.1 on Cicero angling 
to prevent an intercalary month so that the electoral terms (and thus his promagistracy) would not be 
prolonged; Plut. Mar. 85, on a festival extended to block a vote on a citizenship bill. L.R.Taylor (Party 
Politics, 80) suggests that the extravagant thanksgivings voted to Caesar during his Gallic triumphs could 
have been intended to reduce the opportunities to pass legislation favorable to him. 
47 See Taylor, Party Politics, 71, and Voting Assemblies, 104-5, for a discussion of the power of the 
presiding magistrate. 
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had to make a valid application (professio).48 The presiding magistrate also could simply 
call the whole thing off by announcing unfavorable auspices. In 55 B.C., Pompey, 
presiding as consul and unwilling to have the uncooperative Cato as praetor for the next 
year, abruptly heard thunder and stopped the vote after the early returns were going 
Cato’s way.49 Lastly, when not enough voters of a particular tribe were present, the 
presiding magistrate could reassign voters on an ad hoc basis.50  
The key point to remember is that all this was the “normal” Republican practice and 
was not considered abusive in itself, a conclusion based on the Romans’ own attitudes 
toward these routine manipulations. In his 1999 book on the Republican constitution, 
A.W. Lintott notes that the political system was fluid and flexible and not easily 
subjected to proof that it had been “violated.” He says of the system that it: 
 
was not something fixed and clear-cut, but evolved according to the 
Romans’ needs by more means than one. It was also inevitably 
controversial: there were frequently at least two positions which could be 
taken on major issues.51 
 
With all its warts, the Republican system served as a functioning government for nearly 
five centuries. So when we use the term “electoral abuse” to describe the events of the 
                                                 
48 See Cic. Leg. 43 on the duties and powers of the presiding magistrate; also Asc. 89C. For examples of 
presiding consuls controlling the slate: Livy 24.7.10 for the year 215, when the presiding consul stopped 
the vote after early returns and demanded that the voters elect better commanders versus Hannibal; Livy 
37.47.6 on M. Lepidus Aemilianus rejected by Fulvius in 190; App. Pun. 112 on Scipio’s rejection as 
consul for 147, although the people forced his election anyway; Val. Max. 3.8.3 for 67, when Piso refused 
to acknowledge the candidacy of Palicanus; Asc. 82C, for the rejection of Catiline’s professio for 65; Cic. 
Dom. 112 for the switch of Appius Claudius’ candidacy from aedile to praetor in 58 with the consul’s 
consent; Dio 39.27 for the rejection of the candidacy of Pompey and Crassus as consuls for 55. For 
skepticism about Cicero’s claim on Appius in 58 see C.F. Konrad, “Notes on Roman Also-Rans,” in  J. 
Linderski (ed.), Imperium Sine Fine: T. Robert S. Broughton and the Roman Republic (Stuttgart: Steiner, 
1996) 103-143. 
49 Cic. Q Fr. 2.8; Plut. Cat. Min. 43; Pomp. 52.1-2. 
50 Cic. Sest. 109. 
51 A.W. Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 7. 
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final years of the Republic, it means something beyond our judgment of what is “unfair” 
about these practices according to our own, anachronistic standards. The problem of 
defining abuse is further complicated by the fact the Romans had no written constitution, 
making it more akin to the modern British system than to the formal document employed 
by the U.S., where an act or law is unconstitutional precisely when the Supreme Court 
declares it to be so. Hence the problem as posed by C. Nicolet: “la limite entre ce qui est 
permis et ce qui est défendu, ce qui est normal et ce qui est exceptionnel.”52 
Nevertheless, the Republic was governed by a sturdy combination of legislation, legal 
precedent and, most important of all, the mos maiorum, literally, the ways of those 
Romans who had come before. It does not do justice to that term to describe it merely as 
the “customs” of the Republic, because the phrase to the Romans carried a profound 
shared political and cultural weight.53 The fact that no written document had “created” 
the senate, the assemblies or the elections, nor the ancient restrictions concerning 
imperium and the pomerium, made no more difference than the fact the Queen of 
England’s job is not “created” by a piece of paper, nor that the monarch’s powers and 
roles have changed considerably over the centuries. We get a sense of the moral force 
carried by the mos maiorum when Cicero uses its authority to chastise Lepidus in the 
Thirteenth Philippic: 
 
Does it become virtuous men to do every thing which it is in their 
power to do? Suppose it to be a base thing? Suppose it to be a 
mischievous thing? Suppose it be absolutely unlawful to do it? ... 
 
                                                 
52 C. Nicolet, Le métier de citoyen dans la Rome républicaine (Paris, 1976), 322. 
53 See Lintott, Constitution, 4-6, for a discussion of the significance of the mos maiorum in the government 
of the Republic. 
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But it is not lawful for any one to lead an army against his country, 
if indeed we say that that is lawful which is permitted by the laws 
or by the usages and established principles of our ancestors. For it 
does not follow that whatever a man has power to do is lawful for 
him to do; nor, if he is not hindered, is he on that account permitted 
to do so. For to you, O Lepidus, as to your ancestors, your country 
has given an army to be employed in her cause. With this army you 
are to repel the enemy, you are to extend the boundaries of the 
empire, you are to obey the senate and people of Rome, if by any 
chance they direct you to some other object.54 
 
It was this government of laws (leges), precedent (institutum) and the mos maiorum  that 
came under systematic assault in the Republic’s final years. As we will see, the Romans 
themselves recognized violations of these principles as unconstitutional. 
We might then establish three levels of classification in our quest to define “abuse”: 
(1) those things which were explicitly contrary to law – and the source accounts will give 
us many examples; (2) those which were not explicitly forbidden, but which were without 
precedent, and were recognized as contrary to the spirit of the constitution; (3) those 
which had precedent, or technically might have fallen within the scope of Republican 
practice, yet which were employed by all sides and factions, with each claiming its 
actions to be justified, with a frequency and a cynical motive far removed from their 
original purpose. In the end, like acid, this abuse corroded the confidence the Romans 
had in their government, and left it without honor, without faith, and vulnerable to the 
subsequent depredations that it would be forced to endure.
                                                 
54 Cic. Phil. 13.14.  
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Part Two: Electoral Abuse and the End of the Republic 
 
Categories of Abuse 
 
At the outset it should be said that the attempt to classify electoral abuse by rigid 
categories is somewhat artificial. Considerable overlap exists among the categories. 
Violence, for example, is the most commonly attested abuse in the late Republic, but it 
frequently is the partner of other violations, or serves as an accelerant to propel one level 
of abuse to the next degree. Likewise, an election cabal might employ both bribery and 
delay to achieve its goals. The most useful approach is to break down the evidence by 
theme and then put it back together again in a chronological review.     
 
1. Failure to Hold Elections 
 
The simplest way to avoid an undesirable election result was not to hold the election, 
or at least to delay it in hopes of attaining more favorable circumstances. Failure to hold 
elections was not entirely without precedent. For example, in 184 B.C. the state decided 
not to elect replacement praetors.1 But after Sulla, the practice becomes more frequent 
and brazen, beginning with Lepidus in 78 B.C., who refused to hold elections at all and 
demanded a second consulship for himself. In early 77, still with no new consuls elected, 
                                                 
1 Livy 39.39.1-15. 
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an interrex had to be appointed to preside on an interim basis. “You ask for a second 
consulship,” an opponent named L. Marcius Philippus orated against Lepidus in the 
senate, “as if you had ever given up your first.”2  
Such usurpations were relatively few, however – until the ensuing two decades, when 
electoral delay arrives upon the scene as a regular and increasingly cynical tactic. The 
trend cannot be denied. There was an electoral delay or an attempted delay for the years, 
67, 63-61, 59, and then an annual series of delays in 57-52. In 67, elections for the 
following year’s magistrates were delayed for the first time since Lepidus because of a 
struggle over legislation concerning electoral bribery. The people had demanded such a 
law; the senate deemed it unacceptable and bade the consuls to ram through an alternative 
that had to be passed before the elections were held. Violence and tumult ensued.3 Cicero 
ruefully notes to his friend Atticus that no one knew when the elections would occur, and 
in his speech to the senate supporting a special command for Pompey, Cicero remarks 
that he has been chosen by the comitia as praetor-elect three times already – the elections 
had been repeatedly delayed before they could be completed.4 
If the delay of 67 was employed for mere legislative machinations, the next instance 
was more serious, and was brought about by Cicero himself as consul in 63. The famous 
conspirator L. Catalina was a candidate for consul for the following year and was said to 
be plotting against Cicero’s life. Cicero delayed the elections and confronted Catiline in 
the senate, making sure to let the public know he had been wearing armor under his garb 
                                                 
2 Sall. Hist. 1.77: Alterum consulatem petis, quasi primum reddideris. The author’s translation. 
3 Dio 36.38.39. 
4 Cic. Att. 1.11.2; Leg. Man. 2. 
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because of the threat of violence. When the elections were finally held Catiline was 
rejected by the assembly, and he embarked on his subsequent, ill-fated designs.5 
The following year, while Pompey was still in the field in the east, he requested a 
delay in the elections for 61 so that his legate M. Pupius Piso could stand for office. 
Pompey requested an additional delay until he could enter the city and canvass for Piso 
personally (he had to wait outside the city until the day of a triumph.) Having been the 
beneficiary of several extraordinary dispensations from the law and special commands in 
his career already, Pompey no doubt thought the request was commensurate with his 
station. The election was delayed at least long enough for Piso – Dio says it was out of 
fear that Pompey might otherwise point his army in the wrong direction.6 But Plutarch 
says that Cato drew the line at a delay for Piso and prevailed in his insistence that the 
elections not be delayed beyond that for Pompey’s return.7 In a similar vein, the elections 
were delayed again in 61 while Pompey backed his follower L. Afranius for consul and 
another bribery bill was being considered.8  
Delays were becoming more routine, and in 59 delaying the election became a blatant 
weapon in the bitter rivalry between the consuls Caesar and M. Calpurnius Bibulus. The 
latter, after being physically attacked during the forced passage of Caesar’s agrarian 
legislation, withdrew to his house for the rest of the year and pronounced all of Caesar’s 
                                                 
5 Plut. Cic. 14; Cic. Mur. 51. Sall. Cat. 26 has the pre-election machinations, but not the delay.  
6 Dio 37.44.3. 
7 Plut. Pomp. 44. However, Plutarch (Cat. Min. 30) implies that Cato blocked the delay of the election 
altogether. Gruen (Last Generation, 85-86) reckons that the elections were probably delayed for Piso, but 
not long enough for Pompey himself. 
8 Cic. Att. 1.16.13. 
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actions to be in violation of the auspices. Caesar cheerfully ignored him.9 Yet a consul of 
Rome could not be entirely neutralized: Bibulus managed to have the elections delayed 
from July to October, and all the oratory of Pompey and Caesar, who were unpopular at 
the time, could not turn popular opinion against the delay. In the public’s mind, the ends 
sought by the opponents of the triumvirs justified their means.10 
 After Caesar’s consulship he left for his new Gallic command in 58 with inoffensive 
consuls in place and the new tribune P. Clodius Pulcher to make trouble. Clodius put 
through his own legislative program, got his enemy Cicero temporarily exiled (for having 
the Catalinarian conspirators summarily executed in 63), and held sway through the use 
of his newly legalized gangs (collegia). But force was met with force, and an opposition 
led by T. Annius Milo and P. Sestius rose up against Clodius. In 57, Clodius announced 
his intention to stand for aedile for the following year; Milo managed to forestall the 
elections, initially until November, while angling against Clodius – again, a delay 
engineered for sheer political advantage. The situation became ridiculous when there 
were no magistrates in office to assign jurors. When the elections were finally held on 
Jan. 20 Clodius finished in first place.11  
From this point to the death of Clodius and the sole consulate of Pompey in 52, 
electoral delays were the annual norm, without exception. With the political tide running 
against them in 56, Caesar, Pompey and Crassus struck back with the renewal of their 
pact at Luca, including the agreement that Pompey and Crassus would hold the 
                                                 
9 Plut. Caes. 14; Dio 38.6; Suet. Iul. 20. Suetonius notes that wags began to refer to the year as “the 
consulship of Julius and Caesar.” 
10 See Cic. Att. 2.21 for the delayed elections and the unsuccessful efforts of Pompey and Caesar to sway 
the public. 
11 Cic. Att. 4.3; Q Fr. 2.2.2; Dio 39.7.4. 
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consulship in 55.12 Caesar’s avowed critic L. Domitius Ahenobarbus insisted on running 
for consul anyway, failing to get the hint until his entourage was set upon and a torch-
bearer murdered. The triumvirs met legal resistance as well. Their candidacy was rejected 
by the presiding consul for being too late. But they came up with a resourceful response. 
A helpful tribune obstructed the elections until beyond the end of 56 so that a more 
cooperative interrex would admit their candidacy.13  
In 55, according to Cicero, Pompey as consul employed a different tactic: He called 
an election for aedile suddenly and unexpectedly early. Cicero gives Pompey credit for 
trying to thwart bribery; the more likely reality was that he was trying to forestall bribery 
for candidates of whom he did not approve.14 Cato then had his turn against the triumvirs 
and attempted to delay the entry of the year’s duly elected praetors into office for a period 
of 60 days, rendering them vulnerable for prosecution for bribery. The consuls blocked 
Cato’s measure over the hoots of their opponents in the senate.15 The following year, all 
the candidates angled for electoral delay, each hoping for his own advantage, some 
hoping to emulate the triumvirs by stalling for an interrex while simultaneously dodging 
and lodging bribery charges amongst themselves. Not only were no elections held in 54, 
but no magistrates for 53 were elected until nearly halfway through the year – after which 
the maneuvering for the elections for 52 began at once.16 
                                                 
12 For a more detailed discussion of what happened at Luca, including some modern disagreements, see the 
section on prearranged election results. 
13 Cic. Att. 4.8[a]1-2; Dio 39.27-31. 
14 Cic. Planc. 49. 
15 Cic. Q Fr. 2.7. 
16 For the delays of 54-53, Cic.Att. 4.17, Q Fr. 2.15; App. B Civ. 2.3.19; Dio 40.17, 40.45. 
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As a result there were no elections in 53 for the magistrates of 52. Elections were 
repeatedly delayed by violence in the city and the tactics of the candidates. The year 52 
opened without magistrates and without prospects for acquiring them. In the literal sense 
of the Greek word, Rome had become an anarchy, a state without “archons.”17 Following 
the killing of Clodius on the Appian Way on January 18, and the subsequent violence that 
led to the burning of the senate-house, the senate desperately concluded that matters were 
intolerable, and Pompey was appointed sole consul with the consent of the senate as a fait 
accompli – the most irregular “election” of all.18 With Pompey and the senate now 
unified, consolidating their position against Caesar as he wrapped up his conquest of 
Gaul, and with Clodius dead, Milo tried and exiled and the state shell-shocked from the 
tumultuous decade, there was a merciful lull in electoral disruption, though it was only a 
calm before the devastating storm to come. 
Gruen, in his argument in favor of stability in the late Republic, contends of these 
delays that “postponement reflects politics, not upheaval... it does not suggest breakdown 
of order in the late Republic.”19 Yet the course of events from Lepidus onward shows an 
accelerating, increasingly frequent and blatant use of electoral delay. As we will see in a 
later discussion of how the Romans perceived electoral abuse in general, all parties 
recognized what was happening; they knew its dangers; they protested its application – 
but then employed it themselves when it was their turn. There was not much hallowed 
precedent left for Caesar and the second triumvirs to overcome when it was their turn. 
                                                 
17 An observation by Goldsworthy, Caesar, 346. 
18 Sources for the events of late 53 and early 52: Asc. 30-31C, 48C; Dio 40.46; Livy Per. 107; Plut. Caes. 
28, Cat. Min. 47, Pomp. 54. There is no evidence Pompey’s status was confirmed by an assembly: J. Leach, 
Pompey the Great (London: Croom Helm, 1978), 157. 
19 Gruen, Last Generation, 161. 
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2. Abuse of the lex annalis and Successive Terms 
 
Livy celebrates the overthrow of the kings and the establishment of the Republic by 
emphasizing what he saw as its signal virtue, one which distinguished the new 
government from that of the hated kings. The elected magistrates were prevented from 
becoming despots by the simple constraint of their one-year term. He tells us: 
 
Moreover, the first step towards political liberty in Rome consisted 
in the fact that consuls were annually elected magistrates – in the 
limitation, that is, not of their powers but of their period of office.20 
 
Besides this, a magistrate could not run for new office while holding his current one, 
effectively creating a two-year space (biennium) between magistracies and overall age 
limits for the ladder of a political career, the cursus honorum.21. In the middle Republic, a 
lex Villia annalis was passed upon a tribune’s proposal22 setting minimum ages for office, 
with 30 thereafter as the starting-point for the post of quaestor.23 This minimum age in 
combination with the biennium effectively set age limits for the rest of the magistracies 
up the ladder. In addition to these restrictions, a variety of laws re-enacted over the 
                                                 
20 Livy 2.1. 
21 The age requirements were established as early as a plebiscitum de consulibus et magistratibus enacted in 
342. For a useful timeline of electoral legislation, see C. Williamson, The Laws of the Roman People: 
Public Law in the Expansion and Decline of the Roman Republic (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan 
Press, 2005). 
22 Livy 40.44.1. 
23 App. B Civ. 100. 
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course of Republican history as recently at the time of Sulla24 made it illegal for a 
magistrate to hold the same post twice within 10 years’ time. 
Even before the late Republic, there were occasional violations of these principles, 
sometimes by popular demand. In 213, Scipio Africanus responded to objections of the 
tribunes that he was too young for office with the rejoinder that if the voters wanted him 
he was old enough.25 In 151, the elder Cato won passage of a lex de consulatu non 
interando reiterating the principle against succession after three successive consulships of 
M. Claudius Marcellus.26 In 148, P. Scipio Aemilianus returned to Rome to stand for 
aedile, being too young to run for consul – yet the assembly elected him consul anyway. 
Appian relates that the consuls protested the illegal act, but the citizens insisted that they 
“were the judges of the elections, and that, of the laws pertaining thereto, they could set 
aside or confirm whichever they pleased.”27 In 131, following in the unsuccessful 
footsteps of Tiberius Gracchus, the tribune C. Papirius Carbo tried but failed to win 
approval of a measure allowing the tribunes to stand for re-election.28 Nonetheless, C. 
Gracchus was reelected tribune a decade later: Appian says that by then a loophole had 
been established; that if there were an insufficient number of candidates for tribune in any 
given year, the people could return one of the existing tribunes for another term.29 
Over the last century of the Republic these irregularities became more common. After 
the younger Gracchus, the next major exception was Gaius Marius, who bulled his way 
                                                 
24 App. B Civ. 100. 
25 Livy. 25.2.6-8. 
26 Livy Epit. 41. The legislation is analogous to the amendment restricting U.S. presidents to two terms in 
office, following the four-term tenure of Franklin D. Roosevelt. 
27 App. Pun. 112. 
28 Cic. Amic. 96; Livy Epit. 59. 
29 App. B Civ. 1.3.21. 
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into the consulship with popular support in 107 to assume command of the wars, then 
was returned for an unprecedented string of consulships from 104-100. Marius and his 
supporters cited both the precedent of Scipio and the exigencies of wartime.30 His career 
included also included a seventh consulship late in his life, during his final struggles 
versus Sulla, which he held for only 17 days before his death.31 In 83, Q. Sertorius 
opposed the candidacy of the younger Marius for office on the grounds he was only 26 or 
27 years of age.32 And we already have seen that Lepidus demanded a second term as 
consul in 78. Lepidus was thwarted by Pompey, who was given a command to lead an 
army against him. Lepidus fled and died in solitude and grief.33 
The career of Pompey is a study in the violation of the laws governing magistracies 
and commands. In fact, the twin pillars of his biography are the extraordinary commands 
awarded to him in times of crisis by a desperate senate or a clamoring assembly, and the 
electoral irregularities connected with his magistracies. Pompey’s first consulship in 70 
required a dispensation from the senate because he had not properly ascended the cursus 
honorum.34 Interestingly, the modern scholarship on Pompey is unanimously approving 
of this irregularity. A.N. Sherwin-White says the senate was “perfectly competent” to 
grant the exception, and that after all, the law was not annulled or damaged merely by 
being violated.35 A. Goldsworthy deems it “absurd” to think that Pompey should have 
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been expected to follow the cursus after his service to the state.36 R. Seager says that to 
do otherwise than grant him a dispensation would have been “hardly plausible.”37 
Another Pompeian author, J. Leach, finds “a reasonable nature” to Pompey’s arguments 
for special consideration.38 
In the wake of all this, a note of skepticism is in order about the motives both of 
Pompey and of his grantors. Plutarch reminds us of a more ominous aspect to Pompey’s 
impending return to Rome in 71: 
 
[I]n all this general desire to see him and to do him honor there 
were also present feelings of suspicion and of fear; it was thought 
that, instead of disbanding his army, he might go straight ahead 
and, by the use of military force and absolutism, make himself into 
another Sulla.39 
 
Less than a decade after L. Cornelius Sulla’s dictatorship its memory was still fresh. Now 
Sulla’s protégé, to whom Sulla had given the cognomen Magnus, was marching toward 
Rome with an accomplished and loyal army. This was the Pompey who, when reminded 
by the Mamertines of Messana of their ancient protections under Roman law, delivered 
the curt reply: “Stop quoting the laws to us. We carry swords.”40 Pompey also had 
behaved cruelly after defeating Cn. Papirius Carbo, a successor to L. Cornelius Cinna and 
opponent of the Sullans. After defeating Carbo, a three-time consul of Rome, Pompey 
had him thrown in chains, dragged before a tribunal over which he personally presided, 
subjected him to a lengthy and abusive examination that offended all who were present, 
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and ordered him off to summary execution, with the victim pleading at least for a private 
place to relieve his bowels before receiving the sword.41 True, Pompey had established a 
reputation as a peerless commander and an excellent servant of the state, but these darker 
aspects, too, were well-known parts of the picture – and were part of the calculation on 
whether to deny to the general, marching with his army toward Rome, the prize which he 
could otherwise easily acquire by the methods of Sulla.  
Fortunately for the state and to Pompey’s credit he truly preferred acclaim to force, 
and he won a relieved huzzah for disbanding his army. But perhaps it is not coincidental 
that the centerpiece of his platform as consul in 70 was a remarkably populist measure – 
the restoration of the full power of the tribunes, which had been taken away by Sulla, and 
which had been the subject of intense struggles in Rome ever since. This was a payoff by 
Pompey to the masses and it would have a profound impact on the brief remainder of 
Republican history.42  “By destroying the chief support of the Cornelian constitution,” 
Botsford opines, “this measure paved the way to its overthrow.”43 
Pompey’s second consulship in 55 required other kinds of manipulation but it did not 
violate the 10-year rule on succession, which had been reconfirmed by Sulla (no doubt 
because of Marius).44 But Pompey’s third consulship came only three years later and was 
delivered by fiat rather than regular election. Almost all of the commentators, ancient and 
modern, focus on the fact that Pompey was sole consul, an act indeed unprecedented in 
the history of the Republic, but they ignore the second violation. Again the reviews are 
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forgiving. Leach states of Pompey without irony: “He had in fact a deep regard for the 
Roman constitution provided that it could be adapted to suit his own requirements.”45 
Another Pompeian scholar praises Pompey because he “never became a law unto 
himself.”46 J.P.V.D. Balsdon, writing in 1939 on the eve of world events that would also 
display the fruits of unchecked power, was more clear-eyed about the precedent: 
 
After 52 things began to move fast. There was little reason why 
Caesar should not attempt to hold a second consulship a year 
before his legal time. After Pompey’s third consulship, the lex 
annalis cannot have counted for much.47 
 
Again, as we will see, Caesar and the second triumvirs had little worry about trampling 
on the precedents of age or term requirements for their hand-picked magistrates. Those 
precedents were already well-trampled. 
 
3. Abuse of the Auspices 
 
Polybius, writing in the mid-second century B.C., defined religion as “the element 
which holds the Roman state together.”48 In the last century of the Republic it was just as 
often a tool for tearing it apart. Religious justification for the obstruction of elections and 
legislation grew common and was employed by all parties as a tactical weapon. In due 
course not even the masses were fooled by the dueling factions’ claims that the gods were 
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on their side. Several scholars have noted the disappearance of the institution of the 
dictatorship in the Republic’s final century. They attribute that disappearance to the rise 
of two effective substitutes, the first being the so-called “last decree” of the senate, and 
the other being the use of religious vetoes.49 Religion, M. Beard observes, “seems to have 
become increasingly concerned with issues of control between aristocracy and people.”50  
The principal tactic was the declaration of unfavorable auspices by the augurs and 
magistrates to block an assembly – or each other – from taking official action on the 
grounds that the gods had indicated (typically by lightning or thunder) the day was not fit. 
A greater magistrate could use it against a lesser, or a colleague against his equal.51 
Cicero notes the seriousness with which the Romans took the augur’s declaration that 
affairs must be put off for “another day.”52 Yet in paying lip service to the state religion, 
Cicero also reveals its true role in the late Republic by observing that the “immortal gods 
often use the auspices to put down unjust measures being pushed by the people.”53 Given 
the limited availability of comitial days to begin with, religious veto became part of the 
calendar manipulations.54  
The lex Aelia Fufia, dating from the mid-second century, was an important change 
that ushered in the closing chapter. It extended the power of religious obstruction 
(obnuntiatio) beyond the augurs to the magistrates, giving the upper classes an even more 
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flexible weapon when they opposed a populist measure. R.E. Smith writes that an early 
test of the power occurred in 100 with the veto of an agrarian bill, after which “thunder 
and the like become common phenomena in Roman political life, and a further step in the 
war between tribunes and senate had been taken.”55  
As we have seen with the previous categories, in the 50s B.C. the abuse of the 
auspices was taken to new extents, and religious obstruction became the frank and 
cynical equivalent of a political veto. It was no longer necessary to have seen the omen; 
the mere declaration of a magistrate that he intended to “watch the sky” (de caelo 
servare) would suffice.56 A pecking-order developed among the magistracies: the greater 
could obstruct the lesser via the auspices, and could command the lesser from invoking 
the auspices themselves.57  A new stratagem to preempt religious obstruction was 
employed in the measure for the recall of Cicero in 57, heard in the centuriate assembly, 
for it came with an extra prophylactic clause against sky-watching.58  
The decade of the 50s began with the well-known interposition of the consul Bibulus 
against the legislation of Caesar and the delay of the elections for 58. When a proposal of 
Caesar’s was due for consideration, according to Dio, Bibulus “sent formal notice to him 
through his attendants that it was a sacred period and that by the laws he could rightfully 
take no action during it.”59 As Beard observes, Caesar ignored the veto but he did not 
“get away with” his defiance scot-free. His legislation faced repeated assaults afterward 
on the grounds it was unconstitutional, indicating that religious obstruction might be 
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resisted, but it still carried some weight. Beard defines the issue as whether Bibulus acted 
improperly by trying to cast his veto in absentia, or whether he could be excused because 
he was acting under threat of violence.60 The effects of Bibulus’ veto lasted for years, as 
the basis for later attacks upon the lex Vatinia, the legislation promulgated during 
Caesar’s consulship that awarded him Gaul as his proconsular province.61 
The triumvirs personally handled the transfer of Clodius from patrician to plebeian 
status so he could stand for tribune in 58. With typical audacity Clodius rearranged the 
laws on religious obstruction in his own favor. He engineered a change in the lex Aelia 
Fufia, although the exact nature is disputed. No later authority accepts the claim of 
Cicero (hardly an impartial critic of Clodius) that the lex had been repealed altogether.62 
The most likely interpretation is that to forestall a repeat performance of Bibulus’ tactics,  
Clodius changed the law to require the physical presence of the obstructing magistrate. 
This theory makes sense in the light of subsequent events.63 Clodius also appears to have 
tried to expand the allowable meeting-days for the comitia to all dies fasti.64 
                                                 
60 Beard, Religions, 127-128. R.E. Smith contended there was “no doubt” the entire Caesarian program was 
illegal because of this: Smith, “The Significance of Caesar’s Consulship in 59 B.C.,” Phoenix Vol. 18, No. 
4 (Winter 1964), 305.  
61 See Cic. Dom. 40 and Prov. cons. 36 for attacks on the lex Vatinia, as well as Suet. Iul. 23 and Ner. 2.2 
(efforts by Ahenobarbus against Caesar’s command on the grounds it was awarded contrary to the 
auspices). 
62 A claim Cicero makes in Red. sen. 11; Sest. 11, 15, 33 and 129. 
63 T.N. Mitchell, “The Leges Clodiae and obnuntiatio,” CQ N.S. Vol. 36, No. 1 (1986), 172-176. For 
concurrence on the requirement for physical presence, see J.W. Tatum, The Patrician Tribune: Publius 
Clodius Pulcher (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 132. Tatum also suggests 
the change meant that merely announcing the intent to observe the sky was no longer enough. Beyond this, 
over the decades alternative theories on Clodius’ changes have been advanced: 
(a) that the veto power was abolished for curule magistrates against the popular assembly, but not 
augurs or tribunes,  A.H. Greenidge, “The Repeal of the Lex Aelia Fufia,” CR Vol. 7 No. 4 (Apr. 
1893), 161; 
(b) that it restricted the power over legislative assemblies, but not elective, McDonald, Clodius, 173; 
(c) that it gave the assemblies more power to restrict obnuntiatio, as in the recall of Cicero: Balsdon, 
“Roman History 58-56 B.C.: Three Ciceronian Problems,” JRS Vol. 47, No. 1-2 (1957), 16. 
64 So says Cicero in Sest. 33; supported by the interpretation of McDonald, Clodius, 177. 
  36
The year 57 saw colorful applications of the changing philosophy toward obnuntiatio. 
Early in the year Sestius, the anti-Clodian and now tribune, attempted to break up an 
assembly by announcing to the presiding consul that he was taking the auspices. This did 
not sit well with the Clodians in the crowd, who, according to Cicero, set upon the 
tribune with fence-posts, clubs and swords, somehow managing to spare his life only 
because they believed him to be dead already.65 The most dramatic action of the year 
came in the elections for aedile. Milo announced his intention to block the consul Q. 
Caecilius Metellus Nepos in the style of Bibulus, by obstructing all available days on the 
calendar.66 Nepos attempted to conduct the elections on the Campus Martius anyway; 
Milo was on hand to forestall him. After that, they agreed as a matter of mutual 
convenience to meet in the Forum for the next performance of their two-step. But it was a 
double-double-cross; Nepos sneaked out of the city to the Campus anyway – only to find 
Milo there ahead of him.67 No wonder the legislation that year in the centuriate assembly 
for Cicero’s recall contained a prohibition against watching the sky. As to whether the 
Romans believed any of this actually reflected the will of the gods, the sources are silent. 
In 55, it was Pompey’s turn to hear thunder when he blocked the election of Cato as 
praetor for the following year. The custom to begin the balloting was for a single century 
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– the centuria praerogativa, chosen by lot – to cast its ballot first. Pompey invoked the 
auspices as soon as the first century returned for Cato and P. Vatinius (Caesar’s useful 
tribune) was elected in Cato’s stead.68 Pompey’s opponents judged that turnabout was 
fair play: In the debate later that year over the lex Trebonia awarding Pompey and 
Crassus their post-consular commands, opponents occupied the senate-house overnight so 
as not to be prevented from attending the remainder of the debate in the Forum the next 
day. Trebonius locked the doors to keep them inside; at the next day’s assembly Cato and 
other opponents scaled each others’ shoulders to try to make themselves heard as they 
announced their obnuntiatio. The crowd wounded several of them and, according to Dio, 
“killed a few.”69 Again, it should be stressed, the populace did not seem to fear incurring 
the wrath of the gods, which demonstrated the devalued currency in which religious 
obstruction was now trading. Crassus finished off the year by thumbing his nose at 
various augurs, omens, prophecies and intercessions as he departed early for his doomed 
command in the east.70 The ensuing year 54 was marked by delays in the elections amid 
charges and countercharges of bribery and angling for an interrex, and a veto against 
conducting the election was interposed as well.71 
Clearly, by the late 50s the religious obstruction of elections was being used routinely 
for political means. We might even detect a change in attitudes as the decade progresses. 
The opponents of Caesar at least were able to mount some credible claim that his 
                                                 
68 Plut. Pomp. 52, Cat. Min. 42; Cic. Q Fr. 2.8. Even one of Pompey’s defenders admits this was “flagrant 
abuse”: Leach, Pompey, 145. 
69 The account given in Dio 39.35; see also Plut. Cat. Min. 43. 
70 Plut. Crass. 16; Cic. Div. 1.29; Att. 4.13.2; Dio 39.39; App. B Civ. 2.3.18. There is some disagreement 
over whether some of the omens and imprecations attributed in the ancient sources to the opponents of M. 
Licinius Crassus in 53 actually belonged to those of an earlier Crassus: see A.M. Ward, Marcus Crassus 
and the Late Roman Republic (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1977), 285. 
71 Cic. Att.4.17. 
  38
legislation had been passed illegally. But in a few years, those who tried to raise such 
objections were just as likely to be set upon. From both sides of the transaction, by 
cynically using religion to block elections and unwanted legislation, and by ceasing to 
accept such vetoes and responding with sneers and violence, the Romans themselves 
demonstrate that the significance of obnuntiatio had changed for them.72 One of the 
modern Pompeian biographers sums up the cynicism of the decade: 
 
It was politics rather than piety which kept the imaginations of 
tribunes and augurs alert for signs of heavenly displeasure on 
election days, and it was jobbery rather than justice that swept the 
candidates in and out of courts on charges of which the accusers 
were as guilty as their defendants.73 
 
 
4. Violence and Gangs 
 
Political violence in the late Republic is well-attested in the ancient sources and is the 
most-explored aspect of its fall in modern literature. The final two decades saw a rise not 
only in spontaneous violence, arising from urban conditions and popular frustration, but 
also in directed violence of a more organized variety, particularly during and after the 
tribunate of Clodius in 58 and his reorganization of the city into vici and collegia. This 
organized violence was increasingly directed against the elections in attempts to block the 
vote, intimidate the assemblies or simply to delay matters for an interrex. Violence 
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escalated in the 50s, reached a crescendo in 52, then receded briefly before the outbreak 
of the Civil War. 
The mere existence of what Lintott refers to as a “physical element” of Roman 
politics was not, by itself, abuse.74 As he notes, notions involving the use of force were 
different in the Republican culture than our own; there was an element of “self-help” 
concerning justice at the level of the individual and the family, and a common 
understanding that force justified force: vim vi repellere licet.75 There was a 
corresponding physical component in the Roman practice of government, from the 
placement of the curule chairs, to the bench of the tribunes, to the bodily actions of the 
players – to block something, you did it in person. The drama of the Republic was played 
out in a physical space and in physical actions, in and in front of the Curia, in the 
Comitium, in the Forum, at the temple of Castor and Pollux, and on the Campus Martius. 
In 62, Cato prevented the reading of a proposal to recall Pompey by the simple expedient 
of clasping his hand over the mouth of the reader.76 In 55, as we have seen, Trebonius 
locked opponents of his measure in the Curia. On several occasions tribunes exercised 
their right of interposition quite literally, setting their chair in front of the prison,  the 
Carcer, either to prevent someone from being put in, to prevent someone from being let 
out, or protect someone inside. When the supporters of Caesar and Pompey drove 
Bibulus from the Forum in early 59, they employed the common tactic of destroying his 
fasces, the physical embodiment of the consular authority.77 “As was to be the case 
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throughout the 50s,” Millar notes, “physical domination of the Forum became a crucial 
weapon in politics.”78 
As a result, part of the modern debate over violence in the late Republic deals with 
whether it was a normal part of life, even in the final years, rather than a harbinger of 
collapse. Gruen, particularly, contends that the latter period of violence did not reflect an 
overall instability in the state, because it was largely staged by an organized minority 
rather than reflecting broad dissatisfaction.79 This somewhat misses the point. The  
defining characteristic of late Republican violence, staged or not, was that it was 
employed to thwart the operation of constitutional government. The presence of 
organized collegia operating with precisely that goal in mind was no less damaging, and 
no less a disruption to the elections. 
 Although it is somewhat artificial to segregate election violence from the rise of 
violence in general, the evidence for elections still shows the same pattern of escalation. 
At time of violence surrounding the tribune L. Appuleius Saturninus in 100 it was still a 
novelty: the murder of the candidate Memmius shocked the state and forced Marius to 
move against his Clodius-like associate. One result was the killing of Glaucius, an illegal 
but insistent candidate.80 Eighteen years later Sulla, who had seized the state by force, 
dealt with an unwanted candidate for consul by a similar expedient.81 With the memory 
of the Sullan regime still fresh, the state was eager to give Pompey his dispensation from 
the laws to become consul in 70. In addition to Pompey’s virtues, Plutarch reminds us 
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there was fear of what he might do otherwise with his army.82 Violence and murder 
preceded the consular elections of 67. On the day of the assembly the citizens employed 
physical threats against the consul C. Calpurnius Piso unless he accepted the candidacy of 
M. Lollius Palicanus.  Further violence ensued on the last day of the year when the 
tribune C. Manilius forced through his legislation redistributing the votes of the freedmen 
among the tribes.83 
We do not know the extent to which all these earlier instances of violence were 
“organized,” but the dynamic of violence in the Republic changed dramatically in the 50s 
with Clodius. The senate had tried to rein in the influence of organized gangs (collegia) 
in the previous decade.84 Clodius not only brought about a law permitting their existence, 
but actively organized the city into new vici and collegia of his own.85 This put him 
effectively in control of the city: Clodius was now “patron of the urban population,” as 
Lintott puts it.86 A modern survey of the use of rumor and the role of communication in 
Republican Rome describes the collegia as an “information system” that allowed Clodius 
to put his spin on affairs out to the population.87 Soon a network of counter-gangs was 
organized by Clodius’ opponents, notably Milo and Sestius. Much of the violence of the 
remainder of the decade was generated between these two poles.88 
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In 57, Milo responded to Clodian violence by having the elections delayed (Clodius 
had already announced his candidacy for aedile for 56).89 The following year, the senate 
was outraged at the tactics of Pompey, Crassus and Caesar to have the elections delayed 
for their rigged consulship. Cato tried to whip up public opinion in the Forum. Clodius, 
operating on the side of Pompey, stormed the senate and might have been killed by the 
knights had not an angry mob interceded on his behalf, “bringing fire and threatening to 
burn his oppressors along with the senate-house if they should do him any violence.” 90 
Thus Clodius was spared and the elections were delayed after all. When the defiant 
Domitius (at Cato’s relentless urging) refused to withdraw his candidacy, despite the 
open secret that the consulship for 55 was reserved for Pompey and Crassus, he was set 
upon in public and one of his torch-bearers murdered. The triumvirs sealed the deal by 
surrounding the assembly with armed men.91 When elections were held later in 55 for 
aediles the violence continued and several deaths resulted; Pompey was unharmed, but 
the violence came so close to him that his clothes were wet with blood.92 
No elections were held in 54 for 53 because of a variety of bribery scandals, and no 
magistrates took office until late in the year. Immediately the convulsions began over 
elections for 52, in which Milo was standing for consul and Clodius for praetor. On the 
voting-day Clodius and his supporters stormed the assembly and were repelled by Milo’s 
forces. Subsequent attempts to hold elections either were delayed or ruined by violence. 
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During the frequent fighting, the consuls were assailed on the Via Sacra and one of them, 
Calvinus, was even wounded.93 Plutarch describes events: 
 
Often, before an election was over, the place where it had been was 
stained with blood and defiled with dead  bodies, and the city was 
left with no government at all, like a ship adrift with no one to 
steer her.94 
 
And so the year 52 opened without magistrates. When an interrex, Lepidus, could be 
appointed, supporters of Clodius stormed his home and demanded an election be held 
before it could next be legally called.95 On January 18, 52 B.C., the forces of Milo and 
Clodius met on the Appian Way and Clodius was killed. His supporters rioted in the 
Forum; the fires spread from the pyre and burned down the Curia. The conscript fathers 
had had enough. The senate, with even Cato’s consent, appointed Pompey sole consul. 
Among Pompey’s first acts were a series of laws de vi that brought matters under control, 
until the greater violence to come in 49.96 Says Lintott: “The transition from fighting in 
the streets to fighting with armies in the field is essentially one of scale.”97 
It is difficult to see how a rising tide of electoral violence in the late 50s that finally 
led Rome to delay elections several years in a row, and to abrogate a nearly 500-year-old 
tradition of dual consulships, can be considered a normal course of events. Violence had 
become the accepted way of achieving desired ends. In an interesting interdisciplinary 
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study of “collective behavior” in the late Republic, P. Vanderbroeck reaches this 
conclusion about violence: 
 
Because politicians regularly turned to the people in order to 
pursue an opposition policy against the senatorial majority, 
because precedents were constantly established, because violence 
was accepted as a political means, and because the same 
behavioral patterns constantly repeated themselves, a 
conventionalization occurred: collective behavior received a 
regularized and repetitive character in the political process and 
deviated from existing norms of accepted collective behavior, such 
as existed, for example, in the popular assemblies.98 
 
Brunt takes note of the fact that the late Republican violence was used across the board 
and did not originate from a single sector of society.99 Lintott agrees that the violence of 
the period stemmed not from one man’s domination, but from “conflict and near-
anarchy” that arose directly from the loss of faith in institutions.100 Electoral violence in 
the Republic had become the norm, not the exception. It was perfectly natural that, as 
Suetonius tells us, the original plan of the conspirators against Caesar was to murder him 
as he presided over an election.101 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
98 P.J. Vanderbroeck, Popular Leadership and Collective Behavior in the Late Roman Republic, ca. 80-50 
B.C. (Amsterdam: J.C. Gieben, 1987), 162. Vanderbroeck cites 92 instances of collective behavior known 
from the sources for the period, 62 of which involved force or violence. In 37 of the 62 cases, some 
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99 Brunt, “The Roman Mob,” P&P No. 35 (Dec. 1966), 21. 
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101 Suet Iul. 80. 
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5. Bribery and Electioneering Abuses 
 
Bribery and electioneering laws date to the early Republic. Livy tells us that in the 
year 432, the tribunes passed a law against the practice of candidates of whitening their 
togas, which was associated with the abuses involved in canvassing for votes.102 There 
were laws against bribery passed in 358, 314 and 181, the latter carrying a penalty of 10 
years’ disqualification from office, and yet further legislation against bribery (ambitus) in 
151. As these laws continued to be passed until the end of the Republic and even under 
Augustus, their effectiveness can reasonably be questioned.103 The increase in the number 
of praetors to six in the year 197 only increased the competition for consulships, and 
hence the role of bribery and electioneering. Marius was accused of bribery; so was 
Sulla.104 And yet, in a pattern familiar by now, the abuse of electoral bribery grew worse 
and worse over the final century, and especially in the last two decades of the Republic. 
Allegations of bribery surfaced in almost every year between 67 and 50 B.C.105  
As to what precisely constituted the crime of ambitus, even the Romans were not 
always sure. Direct payments in exchange for votes was a clear-cut violation – but 
candidates always danced around the laws with goodwill payments to ward-heelers 
(divisores) and with generous public dinners, games and exhibitions and other 
                                                 
102 Livy 4.25.3. 
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extravagance. Cicero as consul in 63 brought about a law forbidding public games and 
exhibitions by candidates, even well in advance of their announcement for office, unless 
they had been directed to do so in a will.106 Lintott, in his survey of Republican bribery, 
jokes that “bribe” was an irregular verb conjugated thusly: “I take care of my friends, you 
are recklessly generous, he bribes.”107 In the present-day debate over just how democratic 
the Republican system was, advocates for the power of the populus cite the necessity of 
electoral bribery as evidence that the voters had to be courted.108 
The period 67-60 begins with a lex Calpurnia against bribery, forced upon the 
consuls Piso and Manius Acilius Glabrio by the senate as an alternative to a more radical 
popular measure.109  The law was used to prosecute the winning candidates of 66, 
including the younger Sulla; their victories were nullified and new elections were held.110 
Catiline, too, was caught up in the law and his first candidacy for consul was blocked.111 
In 63 Caesar racked up such enormous debts for bribery in his quest to become pontifex 
maximus that he warned his mother on the day of the vote he would come home that 
evening either successful, or not at all.112 The elections of 63 for 62 were riddled with 
bribery allegations; in one assessment the candidate Servius Sulpicius Rufus “had the 
disadvantage of being an honest man” who spent more time trying to prove charges 
                                                 
106 Cic. Mur. 2.3, 3.5, 23.47, 32.67. 
107 Lintott, “Bribery,” 11. 
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against his rivals than winning election.113 Crassus is accused by Cicero of bribing the 
jurors to acquit Clodius in his trial in 62 on charges that he had defiled a religious 
occasion, and Pompey spent heavily “among the tribes” to win a consulship for his legate 
L. Afranius in 61.114 
The consulship of Caesar in 59 was purchased with the money of his rich running 
mate L. Lucceius, with a certain Q. Arrius, a partisan of Crassus, as the bagman.115 
Unfortunately for Lucceius, the other side managed to split the ticket and bring about the 
election of Bibulus as Caesar’s colleague, relying heavily on bribery as well – even Cato 
justified the practice as a necessary evil.116 The first triumvirs took the consulship for 
Pompey and Crassus in 55 by cabal rather than purchase, but once in office they took 
measures to make sure bribery occurred only in their favor. They blocked efforts by Cato 
to delay the inauguration of the elected praetors so they could be prosecuted.117 Cicero 
says Pompey’s ploy of holding unexpected elections for aedile was meant to forestall 
bribery, and during the year Crassus brought about his own lex Licinia to crack down on 
electioneering.118 Ward, in his book on Crassus, says it all was calculated and the 
triumvirs were simply trying to restrict the ability of their opponents to maneuver against 
them: “They had the resources to circumvent their own electoral ‘reforms’.”119 
The year 54 was a veritable Super Bowl of electoral payoffs. All four of the consular 
candidates were eventually prosecuted and the elections for 53 were delayed well into the 
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next year. Bribery was so rampant and money flowed so freely that in July 54, interest 
rates rose in the city.120 In early August the cat was out of the bag: one of the candidates, 
Memmius, confessed to a plot involving a fellow candidate and the sitting consuls to 
reward the centuria praerogativa the sum of 10 million sesterces for its vote.121 The 
senate voted for an inquiry; a tribune blocked it; the senate postponed the election while 
it took its case for an inquiry to the people; a tribune vetoed it again. The senate called 
the election anyway, resulting in another veto.122 Elections for 53 finally were held 
halfway through that year. For the following election for 52, at least, there would be no 
need for bribery to determine the winner – the murder of Clodius, riots in the city and the 
sole consulship of Pompey took care of that. Not surprisingly, one of his first acts after 
taking power was a widely praised, harsh crackdown on further electoral bribery.123 
In its final two decades the Republic tried to restrict the abuses of ambitus with 
legislation in 67, 63, 55 and 52, but the practice continued unabated, if not even more 
brazenly.  “The multiplication of senatorial decrees and laws on corruption,” Brunt 
concludes, “is alone proof that evil was rampant.”124 Gruen argues that the frequency of 
laws and prosecutions do not signify growing instability: 
 
Can one be sure that the late Republic sinned with greater 
frequency in this area than did earlier periods? Prosecutions de 
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ambitu do not prove it. They were generally inspired by politics 
rather than moral indignation.125 
 
But his point that bribery prosecutions “were generally inspired by politics” does not 
matter – whether the prosecutions were “political” or not, they existed, and disrupted the 
fabric of the annual elections to the point of abandonment of the constitution. 
 
6. Prearranged Results, Cabals and Conspiracies 
 
The conspiracy of Catiline to take control of the state in the 60s was traced by Sallust 
back to the corrupting effects of Sulla’s reign.126 Sallust blamed Sulla for teaching the 
post-Marian plebeian army indulgence, greed and degradation, and said that Sullan 
veterans were among those eager for civil war to erase their debts. Catiline invoked 
Sulla’s victories in his exhortations to his followers.127 While Sallust’s allegations of 
what some scholars call a “first Catilinarian conspiracy” in 66 are disputed,128 at any rate 
Catiline’s bids for the consulship in 65 and 64 were blocked, and in the elections for 63 
he was defeated and began his efforts in earnest.129 During this time Caesar and Crassus, 
too, have been accused of plotting to seize power, but either such a plot did not exist or 
nothing came of it.130 (Gruen contends that Catiline’s conspiracy was not a real threat to 
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the state, and in fact made it stronger, by bringing together the leading elements of the res 
publica to oppose him.131) 
Events at the end of the 60s were driving Pompey, Crassus and Caesar into each 
others’ arms. Pompey, on his way back from his eastern victories, was reduced to bribery 
and arm-twisting from afar to arrange the election of his legate Afranius as consul in the 
elections of 61 for 60.132 After all his service to the state, Pompey was bitter that the 
senate rejected his proposed settlement of the east and would not provide land for his 
veterans. Crassus was equally chagrined at his failure to reduce the price of the contract 
for the tax-farmers who were his clients. Caesar, having completed his term as praetor, 
was serving in Spain and was desperately eager to achieve his first consulship suo anno, 
as soon as he was eligible by age, befitting his sense of dignitas. As a result of the pact, 
Caesar was elected consul for 59 and his legislative program included relief for his fellow 
triumvirs.133 According to Cicero, at least some of these measures were passed contrary 
to the lex Caecilia Didia of 98 B.C., which had confirmed the prohibition on considering 
legislation within a trinundinum of the election.134 Despite their efforts, however, they 
were unable to keep Bibulus from delaying the elections for 58, nor to have their 
preferred candidate chosen. They settled for substitutes, one being Caesar’s new father-
in-law by a convenient political marriage.135 
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In 56, according to our sources, the three partners renewed their pact in the coastal 
city of Luca, with a large part of the senate in attendance.136 Crassus and Pompey would 
become consuls in 55 and Caesar’s command in Gaul would be renewed for another five 
years. As we have seen, engineering the election required the delay for the rest of 56 to 
get rid of an uncooperative consul, and violence to persuade Domitius to drop out, but in 
the end it was successful.137 In addition Caesar’s price to his colleagues was to force 
Cicero to drop any attempt to revisit Caesar’s agrarian law, passed during his term as 
consul in 59. Cicero complied, rationalizing his decision in a letter.138 Meanwhile, the 
consuls over the rest of the year cooked the praetorian elections for 54 and arranged their 
post-consular commands with the help of the lex Trebonia. 
For the purposes of our analysis, the significance of Luca is the unusual directness 
with which control of the state was brokered. The sources do not say that Pompey and 
Crassus would stand for consulships, that they would enter the field of candidates, that 
they would canvass, but simply that they would be consuls for 55. Even the first 
consulship acquired by the triumvirate, that of Caesar in 59, at least required competition. 
Pompey had to exert himself for Afranius in 61 for 60; neither could the partners rig the 
elections entirely as they pleased for 58. But by the middle of the decade they were able 
to barter the consulship at their own terms. 
The importance of Luca, and the degree of control exercised by the triumvirs, is 
disputed by modern scholars who say either the original sources have exaggerated or 
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misinterpreted the event. They cite the failure of the triumvirs to control the elections for 
57, 56, 54 and 53. W.C. Grummel further says that the elections of 59 demonstrated the 
dynasts were not in control of the state.139 R. Seager describes Luca as “a fantasy” and 
argues that the effort to which Pompey and Crassus had to go to block Cato’s election in 
55 demonstrates their lack of control.140 J.F. Lazenby says that Dio’s silence about any 
such deal disproves the “Luca legend” and he constructs his own, speculative alternative 
motives based on the difficulties Caesar was facing in the war in Gaul.141 Gruen calls the 
significance of the first triumvirate “a modern construct” and states that it “made no 
fundamental change in the constitutional structure.”142 
And yet, the fact that Appian and Plutarch describe Luca – let alone that Cicero 
describes it with much chagrin in his correspondence – certainly shows that something 
happened there. The argument that the triumvirs failed to control the elections of 57, 56, 
54 and 53 entirely overlooks the possibility that they did not need to. After all, in 58 both 
Pompey and Crassus had gotten what they wanted; there were unthreatening consuls in 
office and Clodius on hand to fight rearguard actions in defense of the Caesarian 
legislation.143 Their program and Caesar’s command in Gaul was a fait accompli. When 
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events turned against them in 56 and Cicero dared to threaten the land law, they took 
action to remove that threat and took the chance to arrange matters again for the ensuing 
years – by 54 all three again had the commands they wanted, and they did not have the 
magistrates (e.g., Cato) they didn’t want. The argument of Seager that Pompey’s 
obnuntiatio against Cato in 55 indicates a lack of control is surely weakened by the fact 
that Pompey was using it to control the election.144 Lazenby’s speculation that with 
Caesar under fire in Gaul, Pompey saw a chance to double-cross him, and that Crassus 
tagged along, has no evidence to support it.145 Besides, to borrow Lazenby’s tactic of 
arguing based on the lack of evidence, if the triumvirs had tried and failed to impose their 
will on other elections during the decade, we would have heard of such a noteworthy 
failure in the sources. Finally, Gruen’s observation that the first triumvirs made no 
“fundamental change” in the constitutional structure is answered by the fact they did not 
need to. Once it suited their purposes, in 52 for Pompey, and in 49 for Caesar, both 
proved willing to innovate. If the conspiracy of Catiline showed for Sallust the damage 
Sulla had done to the Republic, the consulships of 59 and 55 show for us how its electoral 
mechanism could be brought within the power of willful men. 
 
7. Usurpation of Constitution Roles 
 
Among the various usurpations of constitutional roles in the late Republic were the 
removal of elected magistrates, abrogation of their power, attempts by the senate to 
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nullify the assemblies and vice-versa, and finally the abandonment of electoral form 
altogether with the sole consulship of Pompey. In 133 B.C., Tiberius Gracchus decided to 
have an obstructing fellow tribune, C. Octavius, removed by a vote of the popular 
assembly. Plutarch tells the story with drama: after acquiring 17 of the necessary 18 tribal 
votes, Gracchus stopped the voting and entreated Octavius to relent. When he would not, 
the deciding vote was cast, and the tribune was physically pulled down from his bench. 
Plutarch called the removal “neither just nor moderate.”146 This was an important event, 
for it introduced the doctrine that office in the Republic had no independent value or 
authority in its own right – only compliance with popular demands qualified the occupant 
for continued tenure.147 “Gracchus’ deposition of Octavius could be assailed as a 
violation of tribunician sacrosanctity,” Brunt observes, “but he could reply that a tribune 
who maimed the assembly by robbing it of its freedom to vote was no true tribune.”148 
Vanderbroeck concurs with the significance of the precedent: 
 
The power of the magistrates was no longer accepted or considered 
legitimate merely on the basis of their election, but only if coupled 
with proper behavior. If that was not the case, the magistracy was 
not to be replaced, but the individual, irrespective of possible 
constitutional implications.149 
 
 
The ultimate act of “removal,” of course, came when the optimates had Tiberius killed, as 
well as his brother Gaius a decade later. 
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In 87 B.C., the consul Cinna was removed from office by his colleague and the 
senate. He went to Capua and stirred up supporters with sentiments which, despite his 
offenses, were nonetheless reasonable questions about the sanctity of elections: “What 
need is there that we should solicit the favor of the tribes in the elections hereafter? What 
need have we of you? Where will be your power in the assemblies, in the elections, in the 
choice of consuls?”150 In 67, when the people were demanding a special command for 
Pompey to relieve the grain supply from pirates (hunger being the best political 
argument), a tribune named Trebellius stood in the way. But the proposer of the 
command, A. Gabinius, employed the method Gracchus had used against Octavius. This 
time, the opponent backed down once the 17th and penultimate vote for his removal was 
counted.151 And when the consul Piso allegedly was sabotaging Pompey’s anti-piracy 
efforts, the same Gabinius drew up a measure for his removal as well, but was restrained 
by Pompey.152 Five years later, the senate “suspended” the praetor Nepos for pressing 
Pompey’s recall to Rome. According to Suetonius, Caesar as praetor and one of the 
tribunes were suspended by the senate as well for pushing “inflammatory” legislation. 
When citizens angry with his suspension surrounded his house, Caesar calmed them, 
which won him good will and his reinstatement.153 After this spate of removals practiced 
by tribune against tribune, consul against consul, and senate against magistrate, the 
attempts abated, but the possibility remained. 
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A more indirect route at nullifying the role of elections was to make their winners 
powerless. One of Sulla’s most important changes was to strip the 10 tribunes of most of 
their powers and their right to seek further office (the latter a measure intended to cut 
down on demagoguery). Sulla, meanwhile, revived the office of dictator on his own 
terms, with unlimited power and term, and immunity for his actions.154 The only check 
on Sulla was Sulla, who rearranged the state to his liking, murdered his opponents – and 
then benignly resigned.155 After a decade of agitation, Pompey and Crassus as consuls in 
70 had the full power of the tribunes restored.156 E. Badian describes the Republican 
tribunate as a “monster” that acquired its role in the government “by a series of historical 
accidents.”157 For the rest of the Republic the elected tribunes and the senate tried to use 
their powers to circumvent each other. The assemblies seized the power to award the 
extraordinary commands of the late Republic, which allowed the dynasts to build their 
personal power.158 The senate, in turn, claimed the power to declare various acts of 
legislation invalid, often on the grounds they had been passed by force (de vi).159 Lintott 
calls this doctrine of annulment “essentially a political weapon of the optimates.”160  
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But annulment was not the senate’s only weapon. Increasingly at the end of the 
Republic it employed the declaration that the magistrates should take care “that the state 
come to no harm.” Caesar describes this as “the extreme and ultimate decree,”161 and in 
modern usage it is widely labeled as the senatus consultum ultimum, as though it were an 
actual term used in the Republic.162 To Cicero, employing the decree against the 
Catilinarian conspirators, it was license for any and all measures, including summary 
executions.163 Lintott observes that the decree becomes a substitute for the dictatorship in 
the late Republic, with troublesome ambiguity over how much ius can be based on vis 
“without ceasing to be ius.”164 Goldsworthy agrees that part of the breakdown of 
constitutional government was caused by the senate’s overuse of the last decree.165 
This brings us to the climax of the abuse of the Republican constitution. After there 
were no elections in 54 because of bribery and violence, after the elections for 53 were 
not held until halfway through the year, after the elections for 52 were again delayed 
beyond January 1 and the state had no elected magistrates at all, and after the death of 
Clodius, riots in the Forum and the burning of the senate-house, the senate resorted to the 
last decree yet again.166 Bibulus, that old enemy of Caesar, made the proposal in the 
senate that Pompey be named consul sine collega. Even Cato agreed the times justified it.  
Pompey was to conduct a levy and to name his consular colleague in two months’ time – 
                                                 
161 Caes. B Civ. 1.5.3. 
162 Millar, for example, argues that it had no existence as a legal entity. See F. Millar, “Popular Politics at 
Rome in the Late Republic,” in I. Malkin and W. Z. Rubinsohn, eds., Leaders and Masses in the Roman 
World. Studies in Honor of Zvi Yavetz  (Leiden, 1995), 92. 
163 Cic. Phil. 5.34. 
164 Lintott, Constitution, 90, 113. 
165 Goldsworthy, Caesar, 516. 
166 Cic. Mil. 72 and Dio 40.49.5 on the decree. 
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as long it was not Caesar.167 Pompey quickly drew up legislation to crack down on 
violence and bribery. The remainder of the short life of the Republic was spent trying to 
negotiate a compromise between Pompey and the senate on the one hand, and Caesar and 
his army on the other, to save the state. It did not work. 
The modern analysis of Pompey’s sole consulship is divided. Fuhrmann calls it “a 
constitutional freak.” Goldsworthy says it violated “the most fundamental principle of 
this magistracy.” Taylor calls it “completely unconstitutional” and “a contradiction of the 
meaning of the office.”168 In contrast, among the modern authors on Pompey, Greenhalgh 
calls the arrangement “the essence of statesmanship” and Leach “a most ingenious 
compromise,” while Seager cautions, “The significance of the appointment must not be 
exaggerated.”169 Defenders of the sole consulship generally argue that it was deliberately 
crafted to be distinct from a pure dictatorship of either the early-Republican or the Sullan 
variety. Their argument is that even as a sole consul, Pompey was more constrained than 
a dictator by the terms of office and other traditional limits on a consul’s power.170 Gruen 
contends that the measure had healthy Republican roots: 
 
The recourse to emergency government possessed antecedents in 
Roman history. Indeed the antique institution of the dictatorship 
had existed for just such purposes; an interlude of authoritarianism 
until normal processes could be resumed. Pompey alone merited 
consideration for such a post.171 
 
                                                 
167 Asc. 35C; Dio 40.49-50; Livy Per. 107; Plut. Cat. Min. 47; Pomp. 54; Suet. Iul. 26. 
168 Furhmann, Cicero, 120; Goldsworthy, Caesar, 347; Taylor, Party Politics, 149. 
169 Greenhalgh, Prince, 80; Leach, Pompey, 157; Seager, Pompey, 144. 
170 For an example of this line of argument, particularly on the consul’s fixed term of one year, see R.E. 
Smith, The Failure of the Roman Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955), 116. 
171 Gruen, Last Generation, 153. 
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And yet, Gruen’s book is named The Last Generation of the Roman Republic for a 
reason. There was simply no precedent for violating the core principle of collegiality of 
the dual consulship that had existed since the time of the first Brutus nearly a half-
millennium before. The true dictatorship had been legitimate, a device within the 
constitutional framework that legally superseded consular authority. Not even the de 
facto monarchy of Sulla had lived up to that name. But the office created for Pompey in 
52 was a new animal, a sight unseen in the entire history of the Roman Republic. It struck 
at the founding principle of the Republican government that had been instituted upon the 
overthrow of the kings – the principle that no lone man would ever wield unchecked 
power. The Republic’s main bastion against despotism had been seriously weakened. 
 
8. Procedural and Miscellaneous Abuses 
 
We have evidence of a few other procedural and miscellaneous abuses of elections. 
Voting in elections, legislative assemblies and the courts had been converted from oral to 
written ballot in the late second century. This had a certain democratizing effect on voter 
choice, but also drove up the price of bribery. This switch involved the replacement of 
the oral vote-collectors (rogatores) with custodians (custodes) of the wax-tablet ballots 
(tabellae) and the collection baskets (cistae). 172  It also presented a fresh opportunity for  
                                                 
172 See Cic. Leg. 3.17 on the lex Gabinia of 139 creating a secret ballot in elections. See also Taylor, Voting 
Assemblies, and Williamson, Laws, for timelines on the secret-ballot legislation between 139 and 107. 
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Fig. 1. Denarius with reverse depicting a voting scene. Voters receive their ballot and 
ascend the pontes to deposit them. (Late 2nd. cent. B.C.) Syd. 548; RRC 292/1. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Denarii with voting themes on reverse. Top, a voter deposits a ballot marked V 
(uti rogas, or "yes") in a collection basket. Taylor 38; Syd. 935; RRC 413/1. Below, a 
ballot showing the options A-C (absolvo, condemno) used in the public courts. Syd. 917; 
RRC 428/1.  
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interference with the process. Marius therefore had the elevated walkways to the ballot-
box (pontes) narrowed to prevent harassment and to promote privacy of the vote.173 
Nonetheless, Cicero relates the tactics of the Clodians in 61, in voting on whether to 
create a special court to try Clodius for the Bona Dea scandal. His supporters occupied 
the pontes and distributed ballots that did not give the option of voting “aye.” The young 
Cato protested and the comitia was delayed.174  
There may have been manipulation of the centuria praerogativa, the first unit to cast 
its vote in the centuriate assembly. It was given great importance by the Romans, roughly 
akin to our New Hampshire presidential primary. The centuria praerogativa was chosen 
by lot but there are suggestions the lot could have been arranged. Cicero says as much 
when he notes the choice of a friendly century to cast the first ballot in 59 on Caesar’s 
measure for relief for Crassus’ tax farmers. One could choose to believe, Cicero said, that 
the selection was a matter of chance -- or a matter of who was sponsoring the law.175 
Taylor also infers from an inscription known as the Tabula Hebana, which described 
voting procedure in the early Principate, that two of the four urban tribes were excluded 
from the lottery for the centuria praerogativa. This would have effectively pre-empted a 
large segment of the population from exercising its influence in an early vote.176 
Besides the incident in 61 involving Clodius, there are only a few indications of 
fraud, stuffing the ballot box or ballot tampering. One reason might be that the candidates 
were allowed to name their own custodes in addition to those chosen by the presiding 
                                                 
173 Cic. Leg. 3.17.38; an indirect reference in Plut. Mar. 4-7. 
174 Cic. Att. 1.14.5: operae Clodinae pontes occuparent; tabellae ministrabantur ita, ut nulla daretur VTI 
ROGAS. 
175 Cic. Planc. 35: utrum id sortis esse vis an eius qui illam ferebat. 
176 Taylor, Roman Voting Assemblies, 92-93. 
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magistrate. The watchful Cato was among the custodes in an election for aedile in the late 
50s, representing a candidate who was declared the loser. Cato examined the ballots, 
found that many had been executed “in the same hand,” and appealed to the tribunes, 
who reversed the result.177 Varro portrays a conversation among a group of citizens 
waiting for election results. One supporter dashes off when he hears that one of the 
custodes representing his candidate has been caught stuffing the ballot-box.178 Whether 
such practices were common, or whether they were hardly necessary in an age of 
violence, manipulation, illegality and bribery, Varro does not say. 
 
Culmination, 69-50 B.C. 
 
The constitutional irregularities of the final century of the Republic lead directly from 
the Gracchi to Marius, from Marius to Sulla, and from Sulla to collapse. After Sulla there 
was a marked acceleration of rule-bending, especially in the two decades before the civil 
war. The trend is clear in those two decades in each of the categories we have surveyed: 
in election delays or attempted delays (in 67, 63-61, 59, and then annually in 57-52); in 
abuse of the lex annalis and the cursus honorum; in the rise of religious obstruction (and 
the corresponding lessening of compliance with it); in bribery (almost annual 
prosecutions between 67 and 50, overturning some elections and blocking others 
altogether); in violence both organized and spontaneous; in power brokered by cabal or 
conspiracy; and in the usurpation of the constitutional powers of the magistrates. 
                                                 
177 Plut. Cat. Min. 46. 
178 Varro, Rust. 3. 
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After this thematic survey, it is worth making a chronological recap of the climactic 
two decades: 
 
71 B.C. – Pompey’s army approaches Rome as some in the city fear a coup. He is awarded 
dispensation from the cursus honorum to be consul for 70. 
70 B.C. -- Pompey and Crassus are consuls. The restoration of the tribunes’ power opens a new era of 
constitutional strife. A lustrum updates the voting rolls and breaks up the old guard. 
67 B.C. – The senate waters down ambitus legislation. Elections are delayed. Piso refuses the 
candidacy of Palicanus and is attacked. The assembly awards commands to Pompey, with violent resistance 
and threats of removal against a tribune and consul. C. Manilius attempts to redistribute the votes of 
freedmen, with resulting violence. 
66 B.C. – The senate nullifies Manilius’ law on redistributing the freedmen. The winners of the 
consular elections, Sulla and Paetus, are convicted of ambitus and new elections held for replacements. 
Catiline is blocked from candidacy by bribery charges.  
65 B.C. – Catiline’s candidacy again is blocked. This is the date of his alleged “first” conspiracy. 
Crassus is censor but does little. 
64 B.C. -- Catiline loses the elections for 63. Cicero is elected. The senate restricts collegia. 
63 B.C.  – Caesar is elected pontifex maximus by bribery. Cicero is consul. Elections are delayed 
because of the plot of Catiline. The Catilinarian conspiracy ends in violence and executions. Cicero extends 
the penalties for bribery and restricts public displays by candidates.  Bribery allegations in the elections are 
rampant. Sulpicius, the main accuser, is unsuccessful as a candidate. 
62 B.C. – The senate suspends the praetors Nepos and Caesar but Caesar is reinstated. This is the date 
of the Bona Dea scandal of Clodius. There are riots and disturbances at proposals to recall Pompey. The 
elections are delayed at Pompey’s request. 
61 B.C. – Clodius’ supporters occupy the voting pontes to issue rigged ballots on the question of his 
trial. Clodius is acquitted at his trial amid allegations of bribery. Pompey supports his legate L. Afranius for 
consul and distributes money “among the tribes.” Elections are delayed for another bill de ambitu. 
60 B.C. –  Caesar, Pompey and Crassus come to a political arrangement. Massive bribery occurs in the 
consular elections. Cato authorizes counter-bribery as a necessary evil. Caesar and Bibulus are elected. 
59 B.C. – This is the year of the consulship of “Julius and Caesar.” Caesar passes his agrarian laws by 
force. Bibulus attempts a religious veto of legislation for the rest of the year. He delays elections until 
October. The lex Vatinia awards Gaul to Caesar, 
58 B.C. – Clodius as tribune legalizes and organizes collegia and revises laws on obnuntiatio. Appius 
Claudius Pulcher switches races in the election. Violence occurs over the bill against Cicero. Cicero is 
exiled. 
57 B.C. – Sestius’ obnuntiatio is resisted with violence. Cicero’s recall is passed with the provision 
that ne quis de caelo servaret. Milo, Nepos engage in trickery over an election obnuntiatio. Political attacks 
occur against the lex Vatinia as invalid. Elections are delayed again by Milo until November. Milo 
organizes counter-gangs.  Pompey is voted a special grain command. 
56 B.C. – The triumvirs confer at Luca and renew their pact. The elections are delayed until 55 for the 
benefit of Pompey and Crassus. Violence and protests occur. The senate puts on mourning garb. 
55 B.C.  – No magistrates are in office on Jan. 1, requiring the appointment of an interrex. Violence 
ends the candidacy of L. Domitius Ahenobarbus. Pompey, Crassus are elected consuls. Cato tries to block 
the praetors from taking office. Pompey hears thunder to block Cato’s election as praetor for 54. Sudden 
elections are held for aedile; Pompey is spattered with blood. A lex Licinia is passed to restrict 
electioneering. A lex Trebonia awards postconsular commands to Pompey and Crassus, with violence 
against an attempted obnuntiatio.  Crassus departs early, ignoring the auspices and threatening the tribunes. 
54 B.C. – No elections are held for consul because of bribery prosecutions and obnuntiatio. Massive 
bribery drives up interest rates. C. Memmius confesses to the plot to bribe the centuria praerogativa. 
Multiple prosecutions occur, with rampant rumors of an impending dictatorship. 
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53 B.C. – No magistrates are elected until July or August. Widespread violence occurs over the 
elections for 52; elections are not held this year. Dictatorship is proposed for Pompey, but Cato opposes it. 
Clodius assaults a voting assembly and is repulsed by Milo. The consuls are attacked in street and 
wounded. 
52 B.C. – No magistrates are in office on January 1. A mob storms the house of the interrex to demand 
an illegal election. Clodius is killed on January 18, with resulting riots at Rome and the burning of the 
Curia. The senate passes a “last decree.” Pompey is made sole consul at the motion of Bibulus, with the 
consent of Cato, despite the violation of lex annalis.   
 
E. Deniaux concludes that after 70 B.C., the electoral facade of the Republic 
crumbled: “Il semble que les années 70 marquent dans nos texts une sorte de rupture dans 
le développement de la brigue électorale.”179 S. Demougin agrees, contrary to Gruen’s 
idea that the government remained stable and was ruined only by war: “La décadence 
progressive et inéluctable des assemblées populaires, comices centuriates et comices 
tributes, commença bien avant l'ultime guerre civile.”180 Botsford opines that after the 
Sullan changes, the promagistracy allowed such a free range to ambitious individuals 
such as Pompey and Caesar that they began to overshadow the state.181  
Gruen bases much of his argument for continued stability in the years 70-50 on the 
consular lists. His survey of consuls finds that 16 of 18 in the 70s descended from 
consular families, 17 of 21 in the 60s, 20 of 21 in the 50s. The “blue-bloods” were 
holding their own against the usurpers. Instead of presaging collapse, the election results 
of the 50s demonstrate to Gruen “the abiding strength” of a system that was not easily 
shaken.182 Gruen is supported by Ward:  
 
                                                 
179 Deniaux, 294. 
180 S. Demougin, “Quo descendat in campo petitor. Élections et électeurs à la fin de la République et au 
début de l’Empire,” in L’urbs: espace urbain et histoire, Ier siècle av. J.-C. – IIIe siècle ap. J.C. (Actes du 
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181 Botsford, Roman Assemblies, 418. 
182 See Gruen, Last Generation, 127-158, for analysis of the consular lists for these decades. 
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[I]t is clear that a fairly well-defined optimate group, linked 
together by birth, marriage, friendship, and loyalty to the Sullan 
constitution, maintained a strong grip on the consulship that could 
be broken only by an occasional turn of fortune or by the tenacious 
efforts of ambitious and resourceful individuals, such as Crassus, 
Cicero, Pompey, or, as in the elections of 60, Caesar.183 
 
And yet, the election of men of consular lineage does not necessarily prove that 
“stability” prevailed in the state. If we could, we might ask Bibulus about how stable his 
consulship of 59 was, or L. Domitius Ahenobarbus about 55. There were no “blue-
bloods” elected in 54 because no one was elected. The same is true of 53 for 52, and then 
we come once again to the sole consulship. All roads lead to Pompey and Caesar. 
 
Reaction, Acceptance and Rationalization 
 
The Romans reacted strongly to the electoral abuses of the late Republic, which 
argues against the idea these usurpations were uncontroversial and routine political 
practice. Roman political leaders recognized the abuses as unusual and unacceptable. 
They frequently expressed the worry that the constitution was being torn apart. But over 
time they accepted the new lawless way of doing things, and there are several examples 
in the Republican’s final years of the optimates and the populares, the Caesarians and the 
Pompeians, the patricians and the urban plebs turning to the same methods they had 
condemned. They consciously rationalized that what they were doing was necessary to 
preserve the state against the evils of the opposing parties. 
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The decade of the 50s began with an interesting turn of popular opinion against the 
electoral pact made by Caesar, Pompey and Crassus that procured for Caesar the 
consulship of 59. Cicero, who claimed public opinion was expressed most honestly at 
public events,184 relates a spontaneous display of hostility to the triumvirs at a theater 
performance that year. When Caesar entered, the crowd fell sullen and silent, only to 
burst into warm applause upon the subsequent entry of Curio, much to Caesar’s 
annoyance. When an actor uttered the line, “By our misfortunes, you are great,” the 
audience erupted with a prolonged ovation – the pun at Pompey’s expense being more 
obvious in the Latin, nostra miseria, tu es magnus.185  Cicero pronounced the state 
“utterly ruined” to Atticus and said it had traded despots who were popular with the 
masses and hated by the boni for masters now universally hated, and thus a far graver 
danger.186 Cicero relates that over the summer of 59 Bibulus continued to enjoy “a 
wonderful reputation,” despite his delay of the elections, while a pitiful Pompey and a 
frustrated Caesar were unable to move the crowd with their best oratory. Bibulus, 
meanwhile, hiding in his house, published daily “edicts” against the triumvirs that were 
posted in the streets and became quite popular with the public, sometimes containing 
risque references to Caesar’s alleged same-sex dalliances with the king of Bithynia as a 
younger man. Besides the jest about the date being “the year of the consuls Julius and 
Caesar,” Suetonius tells us of another popular witticism that made the rounds in 59: 
                                                 
184 Cic. Sest. 106 describes the three locations he considered the best indicators of popular sentiment: the 
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The event occurred, as I recall, when Caesar governed Rome; 
Caesar, not Bibulus, who kept his seat at home.187 
 
In 56, with new attacks pending on the legislation passed under Caesar, the triumvirs 
renewed their agreement at Luca and had a tribune block the elections for the rest of the 
year. This resulted in public outrage, rioting and criticism from the consuls, and the entire 
senate took the unusual step of putting on mourning garb to protest.188 After Pompey’s 
high-handed dismissal of the assembly to block Cato’s election there were violent public 
demonstrations and proposals to award Cato honors.189 Crassus, too, was the subject of 
popular resentment because of the lex Trebonia giving him a command in the east, which 
was popularly recognized as a war arranged for his private benefit. Angry crowds 
attended his early departure from the city and tribunes and augurs cursed his enterprise; 
he threatened the tribunes with violence if they did not let him go.190 As we have seen, 
public demonstrations and frequent violence accompanied every electoral disruption for 
the rest of the decade. 
When it comes to rationalizing the methods of the opposition, the flexible actions and 
attitudes of Cato and Cicero are of particular interest. Cato and his supporters used 
violence to block the recall of Pompey in 62, and as aedile Cato uncharacteristically 
extended a grain-dole to placate the population.191 In 60, Cato accepted the necessity for a 
campaign of counter-bribery to offset that of the triumvirs, reckoning it to be a necessary 
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evil.192 In the tumult that led to Pompey’s sole consulship in 52, Cato at first opposed the 
idea of making Pompey dictator, saying “that the laws should not derive their security 
from Pompey, but that Pompey should owe his to the laws.”193 Yet he soon acceded in 
the motion of Bibulus to make Pompey sole consul.  
Cicero, for his part, resigned himself to a consular law granting Pompey’s grain 
command, given that the alternative proposed by the assembly would be worse.194  In his 
De Legibus, Cicero says there is nothing more harmful and less civilized to the state that 
action carried out by force.195 But in his defense of Sestius, Cicero recognized that law 
and justice must at times be defended against violence by violence. Commenting on Milo 
and the competition between justice and force, Cicero argues:  
 
He wished to use the first, so that virtue might overcome audacity; 
he was compelled to use the other, so that virtue would not itself be 
overcome by audacity.196  
 
To his brother Quintus, Cicero rejoiced that an important precedent for the Republic had 
been established by Sestius’ unanimous acquittal: the use of force against force was 
justified in the service of the common good.197 
Many thinkers over the centuries have agreed with Cicero’s reasoning. But the risk in 
using force or bending rules in the name of “good” to fight “evil” lies in its practical 
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application, in the natural tendency of all people to identify their own interests as “the 
good,” and the slippery slope by which any method becomes justified to bring about any 
desired goal. If the other side bribes, we will bribe; if the other sides falsely invokes the 
auspices, so should we; if our preferred candidate does not meet the rules, we may twist 
the rules for the greater good. Seen in the worst light, Caesar was a power-hungry 
warlord who disobeyed the command of the conscript fathers to dismiss his legions. But 
he had all the pretext he needed after the senate trampled on the vetoes of three tribunes 
and sent them fleeing the city. He, too, would defend the Republic. 
 
Further Abuses of Caesar and the Triumvirs 
 
Caesar initially pretended to obey electoral forms after taking power in Rome in 49. 
After being named dictator and claiming the legitimacy of that Republican title, he 
conducted elections for 48 in which he was chosen consul with a colleague.198 Caesar 
was careful to note it was his legal year.199 But in the offices and honors he arranged for 
himself he quickly departed from the norm. In 48, he was accorded the power to stand for 
consul five years in succession.200 In 47, he was made dictator for a year.201 In 45 and 44, 
he was made consul for 10 years, prefect of morals and dictator for life.202 In the extent of 
his extraordinary powers, Caesar had become a second Sulla. 
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Caesar’s handling of the elections and magistracies grew increasingly irregular. In 49, 
he “arranged with the commons” that he would name one-half of the magistrates.203 In 
48, he named a succession of consuls and replacement consuls (suffecti); only tribunes 
and aediles were elected.204 In 47, he did not bother to arrange elections until his return 
from the wars; the magistrates thus chosen served only three months.205 In 46, the only 
timely election was for Caesar himself; the rest of the magistracies for 45 again were 
delayed until his return late the following year.206 According to one analysis, 46 was the 
last year that Caesar did not breach the lex annalis in his choice of magistrates and that 
thereafter the pace of his violations increased.207 On the last day of 45, one of the consuls 
died suddenly, and Caesar on the spot converted a tribal assembly to the comitia 
centuriata for an ad hoc substitution, thus electing a one-day consul.208 Cicero joked 
bitterly in a letter that the consul was so diligent that he never slept during his tenure.209 
Caesar named half the magistrates for 44 and arranged for a suffect consul, Dolabella, 
although he was not qualified by age.210 According to Dio, at the time of Caesar’s death 
he had already arranged the magistrates for 43 and 42 in advance.211 
Caesar had troublesome dealings with the tribunes, whom he had been claimed to be 
protecting when he crossed the Rubicon. Immediately he offended the people in 49 by 
turning back the intercession of the tribune L. Metellus, who had protested when Caesar 
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cracked into the treasury. He threatened Metellus with death and told him that “war has 
no use for free speech.”212 In 44, in an event that no doubt contributed to the final 
conspiracy against him, Caesar removed two tribunes whose offense had been to remove 
the royal diadems placed on Caesar’s statutes. His action led to unrest and a nasty 
reaction; his choice for suffect counsel was jeered in public (“He’s no consul!”) and 
angry voters wrote in the names of the deposed tribunes on their electoral ballots.213 Soon 
after this high-handed act by Caesar, the conspirators removed him by their own extra-
constitutional means. 
The second triumvirate of Antony, Lepidus and Octavian, a more formal arrangement 
than the first, was created by a lex Titia in 43 as a new supreme power overlaid upon the 
structure of the constitution. The triumvirs were impatient: The law granting their power 
was passed without the observance of the trinundinum.214 Antony soon picked up where 
his predecessors had left off, blocking the election of Dolabella via his dual roles of 
presiding magistrate and augur.215 The triumvirs also re-stocked the senatorial class, 
depleted by civil war, by rapidly moving their own supporters through the magistracies 
with artificial haste. Dio tells us of several electoral abuses: The magistrates for 43 and 
42 were chosen in advance, without approval of senate or assemblies. With five days left 
in 43, the praetors were sent to their provinces and replacements named. With the 
apparent consent of the triumvirs, one tribune had another removed by plebiscite. In 42, 
city magistrates were named several years in advance; in 40 suffect consuls and praetors 
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were inserted near the end of the year, and aediles on the last day; by 39 the triumvirate 
had decided to name all the consuls for the next eight years.216 In 38, the triumvirs 
promised magistracies to the supporters of Sextus Pompey as part of negotiations.217 Also 
in the year 38, there were an astonishing 67 praetors, apparently including the accidental 
appointment of a slave as quaestor.218 The magistracies had become an open joke. 
Antony was widely mocked for making even a low-born general, once a muleteer, a 
consul.219 It is not clear whether the regular practice was to confirm all these 
appointments in the assemblies,220 but there are hints of at least the pretense of elections. 
Plutarch tells us that Antony was arranging an election when he received the news of 
Cicero’s death.221 In 36, Dio reports a shortage of candidates for aedile, implying an 
election was held.222 
Caesar and the second triumvirs had inherited a tattered Republic that was already 
inured to delayed elections, prearranged results and meaningless auspices. Botsford, in 
his survey of the history of Roman popular assemblies, tells the rest: 
 
Although Caesar continued to submit his plans to the assemblies 
for legalization, he rapidly concentrated in his own person powers 
and functions hitherto exercised by the people; and the triumviri, 
his successors, after a sham-republican interregnum, constituted in 
law as well as in fact a three-headed despot.223 
 
                                                 
216 Dio 43.51, 46.55, 47.15, 46.49, 47.19, 48.32, 48.35. 
217 Dio 48.36. 
218 Dio 48.43. 
219 Gell. NA 15.4.3. 
220 F. Millar, “Triumvirate and Principate,” JRS Vol. 63 (1973), 51. 
221 Plut. Cic. 49. 
222 Dio 49.16. 
223 Botsford, Roman Assemblies, 450. 
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R.E. Smith, writing of Caesar’s consulship in 59, interprets that year as the beginning of 
an organic, decade-long process. “The whole decade,” he opines, “must be seen as one 
vast complex event, whose end was the end of the Republic.” 224 
Just as important a factor, perhaps, was the sheer passage of time. Eighteen years 
elapsed from Caesar’s crossing of the river in 49 to the naval battle of Actium in 31, 
where the forces of Octavian defeated Antony and Cleopatra and decided the future of the 
Roman state. When Octavian came to power it had been nearly two decades since Rome 
was governed by free elections, and three decades since it had been governed by stable 
elections. This long lapse would be a key to Octavian’s success in recreating a 
government that many Romans had never known, or no longer remembered. “How few 
were left,” Tacitus laments of the age of Augustus, “who had seen the Republic!” 225
                                                 
224 Smith, Consulship, 303. 
225 Tac. Ann. 1.3. 
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Part Three: The False Restoration 
 
 
The Idealized Republic 
 
Between his acquisition of sole power in 31 B.C. and his death in 14 A.D., Octavian 
(renamed Augustus in 27 B.C.) transformed the Roman state from an elective Republic to 
a Principate under the domination of a single man. The Romans called Augustus the 
princeps, a reassuring throwback to the Republican princeps senatus, a term connoting 
dignity and moral authority rather than monarchial power. We know him instead as the 
first emperor. Whereas Julius Caesar had failed to hold power because of his offensive 
trampling of Republican constitutional forms, Augustus succeeded brilliantly by 
“restoring” those forms. Under Augustus the elections and the electoral assemblies were 
sanctified by marble and draped with fresh glory. Augustus himself proudly led his clan 
to the Campus Martius each year to emphasize the ancient ritual 
After the upheavals the Romans needed to believe in their Republic, and so the 
restoration was built entirely upon an idealized version of it. In the Augustan literature, 
Rome was destined by the gods to rule the world because Rome was just and virtuous. 
Her solemn duty was, as Virgil put it, “to spare the vanquished and subdue the proud in 
war.”1 This virtue and hence the justification for Rome's success was derived specifically 
                                                 
1 Aen. 6.853:  parcere subiectis et debellare superbos. Augustus strikes the same note in RG 3.2, saying he 
preferred to spare enemies rather than destroy them: conservare quam excidere malui. 
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from its form of government – the Republican constitution. Rome's overthrow of its kings 
early in its own history, and the establishment of a constitutional self-rule, stood at the 
core of the national self-concept. A century before Augustus, Polybius had written: 
 
There surely can be nobody so petty or so apathetic in his 
outlook that he has no desire to discover by what means 
and under which system of government the Romans 
succeeded in less than 53 years in bringing under their rule 
almost the whole of the civilized world, an achievement 
which is without parallel in human history.2 
 
Later, in his dissertation on the Republican government, Polybius asserted “that the 
principal factor which makes for success or failure is the form of a state's constitution; it 
is from this source, as if from a fountainhead, that all designs and plans of action not only 
originate but reach their fulfillment.”3 In other words, Polybius credited Rome's success 
specifically to its form of government. The Romans took Polybius and their idealized 
Republic to heart, just as Americans two millennia later would approvingly weave the 
more flattering parts of Alexis de Tocqueville into their own self-concept. 
 Livy picked up the theme of Republican virtue in his monumental history of Rome. 
“My task from now on,” Livy writes after he finishes off the last king, “will be to trace 
the history in peace of a free nation, governed by annually elected officers of state and 
subject not to the caprice of individual men, but to the overriding authority of law.”4 At 
the end of Book V, in Camillus' stirring speech urging his countrymen not to abandon 
                                                 
2 Polyb. 1.1. Emphasis supplied. 
3 Polyb. 6.2. 
4 Livy 2.1. Emphasis supplied. 
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Rome, Livy makes him ask them whether they would so easily forsake the hallowed 
meeting-grounds of the Republican assemblies: 
 
Remember, too, our public functions nearly all of which we 
transact, after due ceremony, within the pomerium, and to 
what oblivion and neglect we are condemning them. The 
Meeting of the Curies, to deal with questions of war, the 
Meeting of the Centuries for the election of consuls or 
military tribunes – where with the proper rites can these be 
held but in the places tradition has made sacred?5 
 
 
Later, in an excursus on Alexander the Great (9.17), Livy contemptuously compares 
Alexander's brief successes to the full weight of centuries of duly elected Roman 
magistrates. In short, Livy idealized Rome by idealizing the Republican constitution. 
Julius Caesar's usurpation from 49-44 B.C. therefore provided an instructive lesson 
for Augustus on the dangers of omitting a Republican pretext. It is curious, in light of the 
pains Caesar took to appear legitimate prior to 49, how little concern he evinced for 
Republican form once he regained Rome.6 His disregard for constitutional government 
reached its climax in February 44 when he attained the perpetual dictatorship and threw 
two tribunes out of office for removing the diadems from his statues. In so doing, he 
sealed his own fate. His heir did better. 
 
 
                                                 
5 Livy 5.52. 
6 Precisely because the early imperial coinage reflects a vigorous Republican pretext, it is interesting that 
Caesarian coinage does not. It usually refers to Caesar's personal station and glory, or the association of his 
gens with Venus Victrix. For example c. 44 B.C. we find CAESAR PATER PATRIAE (BMC.4187; 
Syd.1069), CLEMENTIAE CAESARIS (BMC.4176-7; Syd.1076) and even what must have been the 
hastily produced CAESAR DICT PERPETUO (BMC.4169, Syd.1073).  
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The Electoral Pretext under Augustus 
 
1. Magistracies and Candidates 
 
In his own possession of Republican magistracies, and in his relations with those who 
held them, Augustus carefully maintained the appearance of proper respect for the 
constitution and tradition. In return an eager parade of candidates came forward to 
participate in the maintenance of the Republican pretext, seeking both the old offices and 
new ones created for them by the princeps. Dio tells us that beyond the title of triumvir 
Octavian demanded no “offensive” (that is, non-Republican) titles for himself.7 But he 
did assume offices and powers with safe Republican precedents. Octavian was made 
sacrosanctus akin to a tribune in 36 B.C. and thereafter was allowed to sit on the front 
bench.8 Returning from the field that year, Octavian obediently remained outside the 
pomerium to address an assembly.9 He was elected to a second consulship for 33 B.C., 
which he both assumed and resigned on the Kalends of January.10 Except for the 
unprecedented institution of the triumvirate itself, Octavian observed legalities with 
respect to the Republican magistracies. 
In 31 B.C., after the end of prearranged consuls under the triumvirate, Octavian 
entered into his third consulship.11 This began an unbroken succession of consulships that 
                                                 
7 Dio 47.15. 
8 Dio 49.14. Other ancient sources differ. Appian (B. Civ. 5.132) says Octavian was named tribune for life 
in 36 B.C.  Orosius (6.18.34) refers to this event as a grant of tribunicia potestas, which Dio dates later. 
Dio's specific description of sacrosanctus for 36 B.C. seems to give him more credibility on the question. 
9 Dio 49.15. 
10 App. 3.28. 
11 Dio 50.10. 
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lasted until 23 B.C. Such a repeated succession had only Marius for a precedent, but there 
is no evidence the assemblies were anything but willing; A.H.M. Jones reckons the 
people were “spontaneously eager” to keep him.12 In 30, according to Dio, Octavian was 
awarded a tribune's power to protect citizens via the ius auxilii.13 That year Octavian 
named the son of Cicero as his co-consul, a nice stroke of Republican nostalgia and a 
final dig at Antony.14 In his triple triumph of 29 B.C., in an unusual show of deference, 
his co-consul followed behind him and even offered the sacrifice.15  
In 28-27 Augustus rearranged the state and his powers. According to Dio, Augustus 
agreed to “conform to ancient customs,” to lay down his office properly at the end of his 
term, to invalidate the illegal acts of the triumvirate, and to share the fasces with his co-
consul.16 This settlement was the basis for Augustus' claim that he had transferred control 
of the state back to the senate and people of Rome.17 Augustus claimed that from this 
point he exceeded all men in auctoritas but held no more legal powers than his co-
                                                 
12 A.H.M. Jones, “The Elections under Augustus,” JRS Vol. 45, Parts 1 and 2 (1955), 13. This eagerness is 
further evidenced after 23 B.C. by the people's repeated offers of consulships and the dictatorship to 
Augustus. 
13 Dio 51.19. He also states that from this point Octavian held tribunician power for life, but is probably 
mistaken; it seems more consistent that Octavian was only sacrosanctus from 36 B.C., but received the ius 
auxilii from 30 B.C., and then the full potestas from 23 B.C. onward. See P.A. Brunt and J.M. Moore, eds. 
Res Gestae Divi Augusti: The Achievements of the Divine Augustus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1967), 11.  The matter of ius auxilii is especially significant for Jones, who traces from this point the 
eventual transfer of the power to hear appeals to the emperor. A.H.M. Jones, Studies in Roman Government 
and Law (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1960), 54. 
14 Plut. Cic. 49. 
15 Dio 51.21. 
16 Dio 53.1. This seems to be a retroactive admission of irregularity, but the sources emphasize the gratitude 
for his “restoration” of the Republic rather than any dissatisfaction with the previous arrangement. 
17 Aug. RG 34: rem publicam ex mea potestate in senatus populique Romani arbitrium transtuli. 
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magistrates.18 Technically, this was true, but no man had held such a collection of powers 
at the same time.  
In 23 B.C., Augustus rearranged matters again and announced he would resign his 
consulship. In return the senate granted him tribunicia potestas with the power to submit 
laws to the people and convene the senate and he retained his imperium.19 Augustus 
relied upon this tribunician power, a Republican symbol, as his primary source of 
legitimacy for the rest of his reign.20 Jones comments: 
By posing as a tribune of the plebs Augustus hoped to rally 
this popular sentiment for himself, and to represent that he 
occupied his high position ad tuendam plebem. .... To the 
plebs, it was a guarantee... that Augustus was not 
abandoning them to the optimates, to the optimates a threat 
that Augustus might revive the popular tradition of his 
adoptive father if they would not play ball with him.21  
 
Augustus cites his tribunicia potestas repeatedly in the Res Gestae.22 He dated his reign 
by it, setting the precedent for all future emperors. Dio considers these settlements to be 
the true birth of the monarchy.23 One modern author notes acerbically of the famous 
claim of the Res Gestae: “Augustus may have handed over the state, but he fails to 
mention that the senate handed it back.”24 
                                                 
18 Aug. RG 34: Post id tempus auctoritate omnibus praetiti, potestatis autem nihlio amplius habui quam 
ceteri qui mihi quoque in magistratu conlegae fuerunt. 
19 Dio 53.32. 
20 Syme calls Augustus' imperium proconsulare and the tribunicia potestas "the two pillars of his rule" 
Roman Revolution, 337. 
21 Jones, Imperium, 116. 
22 Aug. RG 4.2, 4.4, 22, 35.2. 
23 Dio 53.17. 
24 W. Turpin, “Res Gestae 34.1 and the Settlement of 27 B.C.,” CQ N.S., Vol. 44, No. 2 (1994), 427. 
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After 23 B.C., Augustus’ principal Republican powers therefore were his imperium 
and his tribunicia potestas.25 He held only two ceremonial consulships after his 
resignation in 23 B.C., but any inconvenience from not holding the actual title was 
removed in 19 B.C. when he was awarded the permanent right to sit with the consuls 
anyway.26 Jones sees this as another significant step in the evolution of the princeps' 
jurisdiction, as from this point Augustus heard appeals from the praetors by virtue of his 
consular authority.27 As a final note concerning his own magistracies, Augustus showed 
notable caution in his treatment of two Republican titles that veered too close to the 
reality of his power. He notes briefly that he was twice offered but declined the post of 
dictator.28 Also interesting is his pussyfooting around the title of censor, which he 
appears to have avoided despite wielding censorial powers. Dio states flatly that 
Augustus "became censor" in 29 B.C. but Augustus says no such thing, noting merely 
that he had served as curator legum et morum.29 Jones judged that Augustus relied either 
on special grants of potestas or his overall imperium to carry out censorial duties.30 An 
inscription in the fasti Venusini seems to support this idea: after listing Augustus and 
Agrippa as co-consuls for 28 B.C., the next line adds, “these same men conducted a 
lustrum with censorial power.”31 In 19 B.C. Augustus was named praefectus moribus for 
                                                 
25 Another much-plowed field is the precise nature of Augustus' imperium, when it was consular and when 
it was proconsular, and the extent to which it was maius over other magistrates. See especially A.H.M. 
Jones, “The Imperium of Augustus,” JRS Vol. 41, Parts 1 and 2 (1951): 112-119. 
26 Dio 54.10. 
27 Jones, Studies, 78. 
28 Aug. RG 5.1. 
29 Dio 52.42; Aug. RG 6.1. 
30 Jones, Studies, 354-357. 
31 Idem censoria potest. lustrum fecer. V. Ehrenberg and A.H.M. Jones. Documents Illustrating the Reigns 
of Augustus and Tiberius, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955), p. 35. 
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a five-year term and then again in 12 B.C.32 At any rate he conducted three lectiones of 
the senate during his reign and three censuses.33  
Augustus' treatment of other office-holders generally conformed to Republican 
practice. Appian notes that under the triumvirate, Octavian allowed the magistrates to 
function normally.34 A functioning tribunate (or at least, one functioning in Octavian's 
favor) is suggested by a tribune's successful veto to block the plot of Antony's faction in 
32 B.C.35 In general, Augustus seemed to realize that it was more valuable to honor the 
nobles with magistracies than to hog all the symbols of power himself. As early as 41 
B.C. the triumvirs were appointing both ordinarii and “lesser consuls” to spread the 
wealth, a practice resumed later in Augustus’ reign.36 Later his creation of the vigintiviri 
in the city created even more opportunities for patronage. Suetonius says Augustus 
created new offices, increased the number of praetors, and even requested two consular 
colleagues during his own tenure, which the senate refused to do on the grounds that even 
a single colleague was "sufficient detraction from his supreme dignity."37 Although there 
were occasionally shortages of candidates for aedile or tribune, there is no evidence of a 
shortage of willing candidates for praetor and consul.38 The nobles were generally eager 
to take part in the regime. M. Hammond contended that the magistracies under Augustus 
were used as “a sop for the aristocracy to console them for their loss of military power 
                                                 
32 Dio 54.10, 54.30. 
33 See Jones, Studies, 350-351 for analysis. 
34 App. B Civ. 5.132. 
35 Dio 50.2. 
36 Dio 48.35. 
37 Suet. Aug. 37. 
38 Jones, “Elections,” 11. 
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and to symbolize the continuance of the Republic.”39 The link of legitimacy between the 
magistracies and the princeps is reinforced by the fasti of the magistri vici, which begins 
with 43 B.C., the year of Octavian's first consulship.40  
Scholars have spent considerable effort trying to discern from the fasti whether 
Augustus had a particular strategy in the advancement of magistrates. Seager analyzed 
the lists and found that most of the ordinarii consuls were nobles, while more of the 
replacement suffecti were new men.41 Brunt argued that the rise of novi among the 
suffecti was both a practical result of the need for new talent, and the coming-of-age (later 
in Augustus' reign) of a postwar generation.42 In any event they owed Augustus for his 
patronage. The pretext was important: the maintenance of Republican form allowed them 
more dignity and status than they would have received as openly hand-picked toadies of 
Augustus. “Thus,” Shotter observes, “magistrates and promagistrates were dependent 
upon him, but not in an overt or humiliating fashion.”43  
 
2. Assemblies and Elections 
 
The Republican citizen voting assemblies continued to meet under the Principate and 
frequently are mentioned in the sources in the role of ratifying arrangements made by 
                                                 
39 M. Hammond, The Augustan Principate in Theory and Practice During the Julio-Claudian Period (New 
York: Russell & Russell, 1968), 87. 
40 R. Friggeri, ed., The Epigraphic Collection of the Museo Nazionale Romano at the Baths of Diocletian. 
Trans. E. De Sena. (Milan: Mondadori Electra S.p.A. and the Soprintendenza archeologica di Roma, 2001), 
78. 
41 Seager, Tiberius, 107. 
42 Brunt, “The Lex Valeria Cornelia,” JRS Vol. 51, Parts 1 and 2 (1961): 5. 
43 Shotter, Fall, 100. 
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Augustus and/or the senate.44 There could hardly have been a more direct source of 
Republican legitimacy than the approval of the same ancient bodies that for centuries had 
elected magistrates and spoken for the populus Romanus. The assemblies assisted 
Octavian/Augustus at each critical step. At the onset of his public career, Octavian 
formalized his link to the past by accepting his adoption as Caesar's son “in the 
customary way,” presumably in an assembly.45 Dio also says his first, senate-coerced 
election as consul was confirmed by “the people.”46 No sooner had Octavian extracted 
legitimacy from the senate and the assembly than he did a volte face and struck a deal 
with Antony at Bononia. The result was the lex Titia from the tribunes establishing 
Octavian, Antony and Lepidus in a five-year dictatorship as triumviri rei publicae 
constituendae, cloaked by the assembly with “the name of law.”47 So was his designation 
as sacrosanctus (or the grant of further powers, as conflicting sources say) in 36 B.C.48 
His settlement of 28-27 B.C. and a division of command over the provinces was ratified 
“by the senate and the people as well.”49 Dio further states that both “the people and 
plebs” continued to hold elections after the rearrangement.50 In 7 B.C. the people and 
senate insisted that Augustus’ adopted son Gaius be designated for the consulship despite 
his insufficient age.51 According to Suetonius, the popular assemblies tried to name 
                                                 
44 The ancient authors, less legalistic than the historian-successors of Mommsen, often used “the people” as 
a generic reference to the assemblies, leaving us to figure out which according to function. Occasionally a 
phrase such as “the people and plebeians” or “the tribal assembly” gives us a more precise indication. 
45 Dio 47.43. 
46 Dio 46.45-47. 
47 Dio 47.2 
48 App. B Civ. 5.132. 
49 Dio 53.12. This division worked in Augustus’ favor, since he kept the provinces that needed the most 
military attention. 
50 Dio 53.21. 
51 Dio 55.9; Aug. RG 14. 
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Augustus as pater patriae even before the senate took that action, and Tiberius was 
adopted as Augustus' heir by a “special bill in the Forum.”52 In addition to specific 
references in the sources, Brunt argues reasonably that many deeds attributed by 
Suetonius and Dio to Augustus unilaterally most likely were ratified in some fashion by 
the senate and/or the assemblies.53 Augustus took the assemblies seriously and prepared 
his remarks to them just as carefully as he did his speeches in the senate.54  
If the assemblies were grantors of legitimacy to the princeps, he paid them back in the 
same coin. Nowhere did Augustus maintain the Republican pretext more assiduously than 
in the arena of elections. The triumvirate had continued Caesar's high-handed 
indifference to proper form in elections; Octavian seemed dedicated to restoring their 
luster. It was no coincidence that his early building projects in Rome included the 
refurbishing of the Rostra that his adopted father had put at the head of the Forum, adding 
a new Rostra of his own facing it across the Forum at the temple of the Divine Julius, and 
the restoration of a voting-place at the temple of Castor and Pollux.55 Agrippa took over 
the rebuilding of the Saepta, or voting-pen, on the Campus Martius (Dio 53.23 says it was 
for the comitia tributa, though the centuriate assembly met there also) as well as adding 
the cavernous Diribitorium next door for the purpose of vote-counting. Augustus 
personally took part in elections, humbly appearing to vote with his own tribe to show he 
                                                 
52 Suet. Aug. 58, 65. 
53 Brunt, “The Role of the Senate in the Augustan Regime,” CQ N.S., Vol. 34, No. 2 (1984), 427. 
54 Suet. Aug. 84. 
55 Taylor, Roman Voting Assemblies, 58. 
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was a man of the people.56 These deeds were the basis of Tiberius' claim, in his funeral 
oration in 14 A.D., that Augustus had "preserved the dignity of elections."57 
But dignity and independence are different currencies. The truth seems to be that the 
“restored Republic” was increasingly deferential to Augustus' choices for magistrates, a 
deference that later in the Principate would harden into powerless acquiescence. From the 
time of the first constitutional rearrangement in 27 B.C. Dio tells us Augustus was 
naming at least some of the magistrates, while leaving other offices to the free choice of 
the assemblies.58As it so happens, their “free” choice appeared to be in favor of Augustus 
himself, as they kept returning him to the consulship until 23. Following his second 
constitutional settlement in 23, in which he resigned the consulship, the populace 
demanded that the senate offer Augustus the dictatorship; the princeps bared his breast 
and begged to be allowed to refuse.59 Similarly in 19 B.C. the assembly kept a consulship 
open for Augustus and sent a delegation to him begging that he accept it; Augustus 
named one of the envoys consul instead.60 Whether Augustus (who earlier had nearly 
died from illness) truly wanted to step back, or wanted popular acclaim, the result was the 
same either way: By surrendering his formal power, Augustus had the assemblies 
begging for him to pick it back up. 
Later in his reign, his control over elections became more formalized with the 
adoption of the lex Valeria Cornelia of 5 A.D., in which 10 centuries of the comitia 
centuriata were renamed in honor of Gaius and Lucius Caesar and given the task of pre-
                                                 
56 Suet. Aug. 56. 
57 Dio 56.40. 
58 Dio 53.21. 
59 Dio 54.1; Suet. Aug. 52. 
60 Dio 54.10. 
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selecting preferred candidates.61 In 7 A.D., according to Dio, Augustus simply appointed 
all the magistrates for the year; afterwards, because of failing health he stopped attending 
the assemblies and forwarded an annual written list of his recommended candidates.62 In 
14 A.D., the year of Augustus' death, Tacitus tells us flatly that the elections were 
transferred from the assemblies to the senate outright.63 Tacitus says after this some of 
Tiberius' nominations of candidates were automatic, while others were merely 
recommendations – a distinction which seems to have made little difference.64  
In sum, the voting assemblies conferred legitimacy upon Augustus at each critical 
step of his career, during his struggle for preeminence in the triumvirate, in the post-
Actium transition, in the settlements of 27 and 23 B.C., and as his reign neared its end 
and the succession loomed. Hammond argues that Augustus truly had hoped for more 
Republicanism out of the assemblies, but the watered-down stock of citizenry was not up 
                                                 
61 Ehrenberg and Jones, Documents, p. 76. Our knowledge of the lex Valeria Cornelia comes from a 
subsequent inscription called the Tabula Hebana, dated to 19 A.D., when the voting procedure was further 
modified to add additional early-voting centuries. Demougin (“Quo descendant,” 309) says this imparted a 
sense of  “quasi-divine” preference for the candidates so anointed. 
62 Dio 55.34. 
63 Tac. Ann. 1.15.1: tum primum e campo comitia ad patres translata sunt. Most scholars agree that “ad 
patres” must mean the senate, as opposed to some other unidentified group of “fathers,” but some speculate 
that while the senate may have chosen the “real” winners, the comitia still went through the motions of 
electing them. This makes sense, considering that the Tabula Hebana five years later makes reference to 
ongoing procedures in the centuriate voting assembly. See Jones, “Elections,” 19; Brunt, “Senate,” 429; 
F.B. Marsh, The Reign of Tiberius (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1931), 62. For a “topographic” hypothesis  
that Tacitus’ translata meant a physical transfer to the Palatine, for a gathering of the preliminary centuries 
in charge of creating destinatio, see Demougin, “Quo descendant,” 313. 
64 Defenders of the Principate have made much of the evidence that Augustus was not always in control of 
elections. Dio (54.16, 55.5) talks about repeated attempts to control electoral bribery, which would not have 
been necessary in a rigged system. He also describes several shortages of candidates: aediles, 28 B.C., 
(53.2); tribunes, 14 B.C., (54.26); tribunes again in 12 B.C., when Augustus orders the magistrates to fill 
the bench by appointment, (54.30); aediles, filled by compulsory lot, (55.25). But we need not prove that 
Augustus controlled every election at every rank; neither is a shortage of tribunes at a time that the 
tribunate was losing its meaning especially surprising. There was no shortage of candidates for praetor or 
consul – the elections in which the princeps would have been most interested – attested in any source. Even 
at the end of the first century, when the emperor was clearly in control of everything, elections for tribune 
appear to have been afforded some leeway. Pliny (Ep. 2.9.2) was still able to fret that his recommended 
candidate for a tribuneship might not be elected, hence embarrassing him before the emperor for giving him 
bad advice: quem nisi obtinet in senatu, vereor me decepisse Caesarem videar.  
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to the task: he concluded the “city mob” was “no longer the Roman People.'” It had been 
corrupted by manumission and foreign stock and had “a limited comprehension of the 
problems of empire.”65 Just as the weak-kneed senate had forced Augustus to take more 
power, according to Hammond, the people forced him in the direction of autocracy as 
well. Taylor concludes a chapter of her book on Roman voting assemblies by picturing 
them meeting in the fine marble structures constructed by Augustus. “There,'” she wrote, 
“the henchmen designated by the emperors for office were acclaimed as consuls elected 
by a sovereign people.”66 
 
Willing Audiences for the Pretext 
 
The transition from Republic to Principate under Augustus was not a top-down hoax 
perpetuated by a clever few, but a willing, multi-lateral, cooperative process. Up and 
down the levels of Roman society, participating groups cloaked the princeps with 
Republican legitimacy, stretched Republican definitions or looked the other way. They 
created a new consensus reality among themselves that employed comforting old names. 
Tacitus struck a faint but appropriate note of suspicion in describing the early Principate: 
“At home things were settled, official functions had their same labels.”67 We have seen 
how Augustus co-opted the magistracies and candidates and the voting assemblies, 
precisely by stressing their “Republicanism.” He did the same for other audiences as 
                                                 
65 Hammond, Augustan Principate, 131. 
66 Taylor, Roman Voting Assemblies, 106. 
67 Tac. Ann. 1.3.7: Domi res tranquillae, eadem magistratuum vocabula. I choose “labels” in the spirit of H. 
Haynes' inferences about Tacitus' use of vocabula for words that had become separated from their 
meanings. Haynes, “Tacitus's Dangerous Word,” Cl. Ant., Vol. 23, Number 1 (2004), 34.  
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well, and they confirmed his status: the senate, the equites, the plebs, religious audiences, 
the military, the rest of Italy and the provinces, and even foreign states. 
Furthermore, these audiences eagerly cooperated in the acceptance of Augustus’ 
successor Tiberius.68 Tacitus tells us that Tiberius wanted to be seen as “called and 
elected by the state” instead of “having crept into power through the intrigues of a wife 
and a dotard's adoption.” Several of the key audiences we have discussed rushed forward 
to legitimize the succession: consuls, prefects, senate, army and assemblies all took a 
loyalty oath.69 Yet even this was not enough; in the senate Tiberius compelled Messala 
Valerus to swear that the proposed oath was spontaneous and freely given.70 Tiberius still 
protested the award of power, calling the monarchy “a monstrous beast.” The senators 
threw themselves at his feet and begged him to accept as he recoiled.71 
Early in his rein Tiberius repaid these grants of authority by displaying deference for 
Republican traditions. Suetonius gives several examples: He demonstrated a hatred of 
flattery, praised free speech, and referred to the senate as "generous, just and indulgent 
masters." He consulted frequently with the senate and allowed open dissension, once 
even being the only vote on his side of a division. He deferred to the consuls as they 
passed on the street. He rejected additional honors and the titles of imperator and pater 
                                                 
68 The senate and the assemblies had long acquiesced in Augustus' plans for inherited power under a 
constitutional pretext, awarding shared power or early qualification for office to Drusus (Dio 54.10, 54.33), 
Agrippa (Dio 54.12, 54.28), and Gaius and Lucius (RG 14). Eventually Augustus had to turn to Tiberius, 
who was adopted in 4 A.D. "by a special bill in the Forum" (Suet. Aug. 65). Tiberius also held the 
tribunician power (Dio 55.9, 55.13) and consulships (Dio 55.6, Suet. Aug. 97) and was primed for the 
succession. At first blush the notion of “constitutional” or “Republican” power that could be transferred 
across generations might seem an oxymoron, yet even in our own nation's history we have chosen as our 
president a grandson (Adams), cousin (Roosevelt) and son (Bush) of previous presidents. 
69 Tac. Ann. 1.7: ut vocatus electusque potius a re publica videretur quam per uxorium ambitum et senili 
adoptione inrepsisse. 
70 Tac. Ann. 1.8. 
71 Suet. Tib. 24; Tac. Ann. 1.11. 
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patriae.72 Meanwhile, the magistracies continued to function. Tacitus mentions a tribune 
casting a veto during a controversy over the scourging of actors.73 The elections 
continued in form, judging from the Tabula Hebana, despite Tacitus' assertion that the 
real business of choosing magistrates was transferred to the senate. Tacitus describes 
Tiberius' practices of submitting candidates for election. Sometimes he coyly described a 
man's career without mentioning his name, though it might be obvious. Other times he 
instructed candidates not to canvass for themselves. Officially, however, Tiberius said 
others were welcome to come forward. Tacitus concluded: “The greater the disguise of 
freedom which marked it, the more cruel the enslavement into which it was soon to 
plunge us.”74 Despite Tiberius' subsequent alleged depredations, by the time of his death 
the legitimacy-granting audiences had grown well accustomed to their role. Upon the 
succession of Gaius, “the senate immediately and unanimously conferred absolute power 
upon him.”75  
 
Conclusions: Augustus 
 
The abuses of elections in the late Roman Republic provided Augustus and his 
followers with the opportunity to be credited with restoring them to their original form. It 
is too much to claim every audience under Augustus made a conscious, deliberate 
decision to participate in a false restoration of Republican elections – the more interesting 
                                                 
72 Suet. Tib. For flattery, 27; free speech, 28; senate as “masters,” 29; frequent consultation with senate, 30; 
lone dissenting vote, 31; deference to consuls, 31; rejection of honors, 26 (also in Tac. Ann. 1.72). 
73 Tac. Ann. 1.77. 
74 Tac. Ann. 81. 
75 Suet. Gaius 14. 
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interpretation, indeed, is that for the most part they believed it. Even in the occasional 
flare-ups of resistance to Augustus we find no evidence for a widespread belief the 
Republic had been usurped.76 The audiences accomplished their feat by the use of terms 
with shifting meanings. Res publica and libertas meant dramatically different things to 
Cicero than they did to Velleius, who asserted that under Augustus the Republic had been 
restored to its pristine form.77 Hammond, commenting on the changing meaning of 
libertas, notes that even Neronian coinage included the phrase P.R. restituta, and that of 
Vespasian, S.P.Q.R. adsertori libertatis public[ae]. The term res publica became a 
general synonym for the Roman state, not for any specific constitutional scheme.78 
Libertas, too, became a generic rallying cry from which all parties sought to draw “moral 
capital.”79 Tacitus hence employed his subtle term vocabula to describe the nouns 
“liberty” and “freedom” as used in the Principate.80 Even Pliny, at the end of the first 
century A.D. was able to give thanks with a straight face “that the Republic still exists.”81 
Brunt and Moore state: 
 
The constitutional arrangements made by Augustus are 
important as partial explanation of his success in winning 
the consent of the upper classes. They gave him the 
necessary legal powers to perform his executive tasks, and 
legality in itself was important to the Roman mind. They 
enabled him to guide policy in general within a framework 
                                                 
76 Jones, “Imperium,” 114, suggests Augustus' settlement of 23 was motivated in part by a thwarted 
conspiracy against him. Shotter, Augustus, 34, believes in the late 20s B.C. the princeps was not as secure 
as he is generally portrayed. Dio (54.15) tells us of a conspiracy that resulted in executions in 18 B.C., and 
later of the plots of Cn. Cornelius (55.14) and P. Rufus (55.27).  
77 Vell. Pat. 2.89: Prisca illa et antiqua rei publicae forma revocata. 
78 M. Hammond, "Res olim dissociabiles: Principatus ac Libertas: Liberty under the Early Roman 
Empire." Harv. Stud. Vol. 67 (1963): 99-101. 
79 Mourtisen, Plebs, 11. 
80 Haynes, “Tacitus,” 43. 
81 Plin. Pan. 93. 
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which preserved the Republican forms. The Republican 
constitution was hallowed by antiquity; and it was as a 
Republic that Rome had grown great.82 
 
Octavian emerged from the Republican rubble to shape a new regime from 31 B.C. 
onward. He did not rule by the hated title of rex but merely as princeps, first citizen. For 
the rest of his life the renamed Augustus governed in two ways: through his unofficial 
personal standing (auctoritas) and by employing a salad-bowl of official titles and 
powers (potestas) carried over from the Republican constitution. History knows him as 
the first emperor. Yet by maintaining Republican labels, holding elections and consulting 
the senate, Augustus asserted until his death in 14 A.D that he had "restored the 
Republic," and he was widely credited by his contemporaries with doing exactly that. The 
most striking aspect of this process was that it was ratified at every level of Roman 
society and even by some external actors – senate and aristocracy, magistrates and 
candidates, assemblies, army, urban plebs, intellectuals, Italians and provincials, allied 
states and foreign kings. If we could build a time machine, visit the Forum and inquire of 
a citizen of Augustan Rome (perhaps on his way to a sham election) whether he regretted 
surrendering a half-millennium of libertas to this new form of tyranny, he would be 
astonished at such a nonsensical question.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
82 Brunt and Moore, RG, 16. 
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Conclusions: The Role of Electoral Abuse 
 
As the Republic careened toward collapse in the 60s and 50s B.C. its constitutional 
mechanisms proved incapable of dealing with unrestrained assertions of group interests, 
political rivalry, violence and urban frustration. Some scholars blame the senate for its 
failure to comprehend what was happening and the retreat of the optimates into a 
reactionary shell. Some blame urban pressures and the utter lack of any constitutional 
mechanism for dealing with the unprecedented degree of urban violence. Some blame 
pressure from the Italians and the provinces; others, the dissatisfactions of the military. 
The system of government that was developed under a small city-state founded upon 
seven hills could not be stretched to govern an empire.83 
As a result the Romans bent and ultimately broke their Republican constitution. The 
focal point for all their problems and frustrations was the mechanism for control of the 
government – the annual elections. Each group, faction and party set about to manipulate 
the elections for its own interests. Each sought to delay the elections, to bend the laws 
concerning office, to abuse religious obstruction, to cow the assemblies by violence or to 
buy them with money, to control them by cabal, to usurp the powers of the elected 
magistrates, and on occasion simply to stuff the ballot-box or to rig the procedure. Any 
original justification for the existence of such measures, even ostensibly “legal” ones, 
                                                 
83 See Brunt, (Fall, 72, 79, 81) for the failures of the senate; for pressure from the provinces, 69; for 
pressure from the soldiers, 77. For the lack of police power, see Crawford, Roman Republic, 14; and 
Lintott, Violence, 4, 174. For the limits of the city-state government, see Shotter, Fall, 96.  
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was swept away in the zeal of their application. Each practitioner of abuse, considering 
himself to be acting for the “good,” justified his abuse by the offenses of another. 
This was the lawless state inherited by Caesar and the second triumvirs, who were 
thus able to treat the elections and the magistracies as the shams they had become. And 
when the despots had finished laying the state to waste for another 18 years beyond that, 
Augustus, mindful of the provinces’ weariness from being bled, of the desperate urban 
population, of the bankrupted equites and the exhausted upper classes, of their craving for 
order above all else, gave them what they wanted. Crawford concludes: 
 
It was becoming possible to represent a monarchy as compatible 
with the Roman system of values and to the fact that almost all 
men were becoming increasingly receptive to such arguments.84 
 
In the 1954 play A Man for all Seasons by Thomas Bolt, the character of Sir Thomas 
More, who eventually loses his life to principle, argues over the importance of the rule of 
law with a character named Roper: 
 
ROPER: So now you’d give the devil the benefit of the law? 
 
MORE: Yes. What would you do? Cut a great road through the 
law to get after the devil? 
 
ROPER: I’d cut down every tree in England to do that. 
 
MORE: Oh, and when the last law was down and the devil turned 
on you where would you hide, Roper, all the laws being flat? This 
country is planed thick with laws from coast to coast, man’s laws 
not God’s, and if you cut them down – and you’re just the man to 
do it – do you really think you could stand upright in the winds that 
blow then? Yes, I’d give the devil the benefit of the law, for my 
own safety’s sake. 
                                                 
84 Crawford, Roman Republic, 187. 
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Human nature is to sacrifice principle to exigency. This is precisely what happened with 
elections in the late Republic, as that state imploded amidst class strife, urban violence, 
and power struggles among a new breed of proconsular warlords.  The fault of the final 
generation of the Roman Republic was to trample its rules for desired ends, rules which 
were to be enforced against opponents, but to be dispensed with for supporters. The 
lesson is general for all times and all nations: We establish the rule of law to guard 
against the rule of despots; the challenge lies in not forgetting why we did it. 
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